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Abstract
The extent to which discrimination can explain racial wage gaps is one of the most divisive
subjects in the social sciences. Using a newly available dataset, this paper develops a simple
empirical test which, under plausible conditions, provides a lower bound on the extent of discrim-
ination in the labor market. Taken at face value, our estimates imply that di?erential treatment
accounts for at least one third of the black-white wage gap. We argue that the patterns in our
data are consistent with a search-matching model in which employers statistically discriminate
on the basis of race when hiring unemployed workers, but learn about their marginal product
over time. However, we cannot rule out other forms of discrimination.
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1 Introduction
In the past ve decades, social scientists have attempted to identify discrimination in a variety of
ways. These include estimating residual wage gaps net of the e?ect of observable characteristics and
pre-market skills (Corcoran and Duncan 1979, Reimers 1983, O’Neill 1990, Neal and Johnson 1996,
Black et al. 2010, among others), developing structural models of the labor market (e.g., Bowlus
and Eckstein 2002, Eckstein and Wolpin 1999), as well as audit studies and related experiments
(e.g., Ayres and Siegelman 1995, Neumark et al. 1996, Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004, Pager
2007).
Surprisingly, these approaches arrive at starkly di?erent conclusions. While experimental and
structural analyses often report di?erential treatment by race, the best available reduced form
evidence seems to suggests that “the black-white wage gap primarily reects a skill gap” (Neal and
Johnson 1996, p. 869) and that “labor market discrimination is no longer a rst-order quantitative
problem in America” (Heckman 1998, p. 101).
However, all of these methods are subject to important limitations. Estimating Mincerian
equations to account for racial di?erences in individuals’ endowments and pre-market factors will
misstate the extent of discrimination if skill bundles or other important characteristics are unob-
servable. Structurally modelling unobserved heterogeneity side-steps this issue, but comes at the
cost of imposing parametric restrictions; and (quasi-)experimental evidence of di?erential treat-
ment by race may mistake discriminatory tastes of the average employer for market discrimination
(Heckman 1998).1
Gaining a better understanding of the impact of labor market discrimination on racial wage
gaps is of great importance, as the appropriate policy lever, if any, depends critically on the an-
swer. If discrimination is quantitatively important, then the case for anti-discrimination policy or
even “a?rmative action” may be justied. If, however, racial wage gaps are determined before
individuals enter the labor market or if discrimination is not a rst order problem, then the case
for government intervention is much weaker.
Using rich longitudinal data on a large sample of unemployed workers in the state of New
Jersey who completed weekly interviews for up to twelve weeks, we develop a simple test for the
presence of racial discrimination in the labor market. Four features of this data set — information
1 In addition to these points, Charles and Guryan’s (2011) discussion of challenges to identifying discrimination
also emphasizes that individuals’ self-identied race is a social construct, which may be endogeneous to labor market
success; thereby complicating the identication of discrimination.
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on search behaviors and search strategies, data on o?ered (as opposed to only accepted) wages,
administrative information on previous earnings, and timing (data were collected during a period
of mass unemployment) — enable us to conduct a novel test of racial discrimination in job nding
and o?ered wages. The key idea is that under the null hypothesis of “equal treatment,” wages
will closely resemble a worker’s marginal product. Hence, conditional on wage on the previous job,
there should be no racial di?erences in wage o?ers. By controlling for previous wage, we account
for the market valuation of skill bundles, non-cognitive skills, and similar variables that previous
research treated as unobservable. Finding racial di?erences after controlling for previous earnings
would thus lead us to reject the null of no discrimination.
This approach rests on two important identifying assumptions. First, we assume that, ceteris
paribus, blacks and whites draw job o?ers from a comparable set of rms in similar markets, which
implies that search intensities, search strategies, discount rates, and so on do not di?er signicantly
across racial groups. This assumption is partially testable. Adding controls for hours spent looking
for a job, how many rms an individual contacted, the types of jobs to which she applied, bargaining
behavior, or discounting does not signicantly alter the results.2
The second assumption is that previous wage does not systematically overstate blacks’ produc-
tivity relative to that of whites. If previous wage equals marginal product, then this assumption
holds and our approach will correctly identify racial discrimination. If previous wage is a function
of both productivity and di?erential treatment by race, then our approach will provide a lower
bound on the impact of discrimination. Conversely, if previous wage captures marginal product
plus a diversity preference or the e?ect of a?rmative action, then assumption two is violated and
we will overstate the amount of discrimination in the market. Unfortunately, this assumption is
not directly testable.
The bottom line is simple: if one believes that, conditional on previous wage, blacks are at least
as qualied as whites, then our approach identies a lower bound of discrimination in the labor
market. If one believes the opposite to be true, then our approach is invalid.3
The results from our test of racial discrimination in the labor market are both interesting and
informative. While the raw black-white gap in our data — ?0?404 log points — is slightly larger
2 If, however, mass unemployment during the 2009 recession a?ects any of the variables captured in previous wage
di?erently for blacks than whites, then this assumption might be violated.
3Our ndings are robust to potential confounding factors such as mean reversion in reversion, severe measurement
error, or di?erent empirical models. Robustness checks on these dimensions are contained in Appendix C. If the e?ects
of discrimination accumulate with labor market experience, then our lower bound is not likely to bind. We thank
Betsey Stevenson for bringing this to our attention.
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than the gaps in commonly used datasets such as the Current Population Survey (CPS), Census,
or National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79); controlling for previous wage decreases
the gap to ?0?169 (?056). Adding additional controls for industry, occupation, duration of un-
employment, bargaining behavior, geographic characteristics, search behavior and search intensity,
discount rates, and metropolitan area xed e?ects reduces the gap by at most 0?042 log points.
Thus, under assumptions one and two above, our data reveal that the impact of racial discrimination
on o?ered wages is at least one third of the raw gap for blacks.4
We argue that our empirical ndings are consistent with a search-matching model of the labor
market — similar to the that developed in Jovanovic (1979) — in which employers statistically dis-
criminate based on race when hiring from the market, but learn about their employees productivity
over time. The model has three stages. In the rst stage, unemployed workers are stochastically
matched with rms. After observing a productivity signal the rm o?ers a worker her expected
marginal product, and the worker decides whether or not to accept the o?er. If she declines, she
remains unemployed, but has the chance of being rematched in the next period. If the worker ac-
cepts, she works for one period, and in the next period both the worker and the rm learn the true
productivity of their match. Firms then o?er a worker her match-specic marginal product. The
worker decides whether to continue the employment relationship (until an exogenous separation
occurs), or to enter unemployment and search for a better match.
The model’s predictions are borne out in the data. As in Black (1995), the presence of sta-
tistical discrimination in our search-matching model implies that reservation wages are lower for
blacks. Empirically, we estimate that blacks have a 7% lower reservation wage than similar whites.
Moreover, if blacks are more likely to incur a job separation than whites, then the model predicts
that the aggregate black-white wage gap may increase with age or experience across rms. This
fact has been documented by Altonji and Blank (1999), Altonji and Pierret (2001), and Oettinger
(1996). Within rms, however, racial wage gaps are predicted to decrease with tenure, as employers
learn about a worker’s marginal product. Using both our data and detailed data on work histories
from the NLSY79, we show that the data are consistent with this prediction. In our data from
the state of New Jersey, for instance, blacks experience a 1?1 percentage points higher return to
tenure than whites. Extending the empirical work of Altonji and Pierret (2001), we demonstrate
that although the black-white wage gap widens by 0?9 percentage points per year of potential labor
4These estimates are similar to those recently reported in Lang and Manove (2011) using the NSLY79 and
controlling for educational attainment as well as a test score taken when individuals were in middle or high school.
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market experience, it decreases by 1?2 percentage points per year of tenure with a given employer.
Finally, our analysis addresses a common critique of statistical discrimination models (e.g., Neal
2006). Simple models of this kind predict lower returns to education for blacks than for whites. Yet,
if anything the opposite appears to be true empirically. While we do not model investment directly,
our dynamic search-matching model of statistical discrimination is exible enough to account for
this important point. For instance, blacks may experience weakly higher returns on investment in
our model if education reduces the variance in the signal to employers (for empirical evidence see
Arcidiacono et al. 2010), or if educational attainment decreases the probability of job loss (Kletzer
1998); thereby letting blacks garner larger returns to tenure.
Although our model of statistical discrimination is consistent with the patterns in our data and
sidesteps common critiques of such models, we cannot rule out that other forms of discrimination
generate the data. Pre-market factors alone, however, cannot explain the full set of facts.5 Thus,
taking our estimates at face value, labor market discrimination appears to be an impediment to
racial income equality. This suggests that alleviating racial inequality may take a combination of
policies to both eliminate barriers to investing in pre-market skills and anti-discrimination enforce-
ment so that minorities are appropriately rewarded for those skills.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of
the literature on racial discrimination in the labor market. Section 3 outlines a search-matching
model in which rms statistically discriminate on the basis of race. Section 4 describes the data
used in our analysis as well as our econometric approach. Empirical evidence on racial di?erences
in wage o?ers and job nding is presented in Section 5. Section 6 tests additional predictions of
our model, and Section 7 discusses to which extent alternative theories may reconcile our ndings.
There are three appendices. Appendix A contains technical proofs, Appendix B describes the
construction of our samples as well as the coding of variables, and Appendix C contains additional
empirical results.
2 Race and the Labor Market
There exists a very large literature on racial di?erences in wages.6 In what follows, we divide
the literature into three categories based on the strategy used to identify discrimination. The
5Charles and Guryan (2008) argue that taste-based discrimination in the spirit of Becker (1957) explains about
one quarter of the black-white gap. While we cannot rule out that taste-based discrimination per se, the patterns in
our data are inconsistent with models that rely exclusively on racial animus.
6For an excellent (though somewhat dated) review see Altonji and Blank (1999).
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rst section describes analyses using Mincerian equations and the assumptions needed to obtain
causal estimates. The second section discusses the literature which imposes parametric restrictions
to estimate structural models of the labor market; and the last section reviews experimental ap-
proaches. Broadly summarizing, the existing evidence is inconclusive as to whether discrimination
is of rst-order importance in today’s labor market.
2.1 Mincerian Equations
A large number of empirical studies estimate Mincerian equations and dene labor market discrim-
ination as the wage di?erential between racial groups net of a set of observable characteristics such
as age, education, occupation, geographical location, and labor market experience (e.g., Corcoran
and Duncan 1979, Reimers 1983, Smith and Welch 1986, Blau and Beller 1992, Oaxaca 1973, Oax-
aca and Ransom 1994, Darity and Mason 1998). While this approach is useful in accounting for
racial di?erences in endowments, it will identify the causal e?ect of discrimination if and only if
unobservable determinants of individuals’ wages do not systematically di?er by race. Therefore,
estimates of racial discrimination in this tradition depend crucially on the set of included controls.
Corcoran and Duncan (1979) constitutes an early attempt to account for a comprehensive set
of covariates. Their ndings indicate that blacks and whites enjoy similar returns to observable
characteristics; yet racial di?erences in these factors account for only half of the raw wage gap. The
authors interpret this as evidence of pervasive discrimination. Similarly, paying careful attention
to selection bias, Reimers (1983) estimates that discrimination is responsible for a up to 86% of the
total di?erence in the wages between Hispanic and non-Hispanic white men, and for about 60% of
the black-white wage gap.
Fairlie and Kletzer (1998) examine black-white disparities in job displacement and re-employment
rates. They document approximately 30 percent higher rates of displacement and substantially
lower re-employment probabilities for black workers. Although observable factors (in particular
education and occupation) play an important role in accounting for the raw racial di?erence, a
large fraction of the gap remains unexplained–leaving ample room for discrimination.
In stark contrast, the seminal contributions by O’Neill (1990) and Neal and Johnson (1996)
demonstrate that racial disparities in wages narrow dramatically — and sometimes even reverse —
upon accounting for a measure of pre-market skill. More specically, using data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), Neal and Johnson (1996) report that conditioning
only on age as well as an individual’s score on the Armed Forces Qualication Test (AFQT) reduces
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the raw racial gap in wages by more than 70%. The resulting residual black-white wage di?erences
are ??072 and ?035 log points for men and women, respectively. Based on this evidence Neal and
Johnson (1996) — as well as many subsequent observers — conclude that the black-white wage gap
is primarily due to di?erences in pre-market skills as opposed to discrimination. And, thus, it is
argued that appropriate public policies for alleviating racial di?erences in wages should be aimed
at eliminating the hurdles black children face in acquiring marketable skills (e.g., Fryer 2011).
Lang and Manove (2011), however, point out that racial gaps in wages re-emerge when one
controls for educational attainment in addition to AFQT scores (see also Carneiro et al. 2005,
and the appendix to Neal and Johnson 1996). More specically, they show that the gap increases
from ??09 to ??15 log points when including years of schooling in Neal and Johnson’s (1996)
original specication, and argue that when one controls for AFQT performance, blacks have higher
educational attainment than whites and that the labor market discriminates against blacks by not
nancially rewarding them for greater education.7
2.2 Structural Models of the Labor Market
Recognizing the inherent problems of the Mincerian approach, another strand of the literature
develops structural models of the labor market in order to estimate the e?ect of discrimination (e.g.,
Wolpin 1992, Eckstein and Wolpin 1999, and Bowlus and Eckstein 2002, among others). Blinder
(1973), for instance, uses a simultaneous equation specication to account for the endogeneity of
education and union status. He estimates that between 40% and 70% of the racial gap in the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is due to discrimination.
However, if individuals engage in costly job search, then the distribution of observed wages
will not correspond to the distribution of wage o?ers, and estimates of discrimination based on
the former may confound disparate treatment with any other factor determining reservation wages,
in particular search costs. To address this issue, Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) develop a two-sided
search-matching model which delivers an upper bound on the impact of discrimination. Estimates
from the NLSY79 indicate that discrimination can potentially explain the entire gap.
Similarly, in an attempt to disentangle unobserved productivity di?erences from discrimination
by rms, Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) estimate an equilibrium search model in which some employers
7 In an appendix Neal and Johnson (1996) show that conditional on both AFQT and education racial wage gaps
are larger at the bottom of the education distribution and smaller at the top. Lang and Manove (2011) argue that
the convergence at high levels of skill is a consequence of statistical discrimination, since informational asymmetries
likely decrease for college graduates.
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incur disutility from hiring blacks. Their results imply that the productivity of blacks is on average
only 3.3% lower than that of whites, whereas employers’ distaste for blacks is equivalent to 31% of
whites’ productivity level, and 56% of rms discriminate. An important limitation to the structural
approach is its reliance on restrictive assumptions to ensure identication.
2.3 Field and Quasi-Experiments
A third branch of the literature seeks to identify discrimination by using eld and quasi-experiments.
In-person audit studies, for instance, compare the probability of receiving a callback or job o?er
across carefully matched pairs of black and white individuals who pose as applicants in real world
job searches (e.g., Turner et al. 1991, Bendick and Reinoso 1994, Pager 2003, Pager et al. 2009).8
Almost uniformly these studies nd that black testers fare substantially worse than their white
counterparts; which is commonly interpreted as strong evidence of discrimination. However, as
emphasized by Heckman (1998), the validity of this approach depends crucially on the assumption
that tester pairs are not only similar on observables, but that the distribution of unobservable
characteristics does not di?er by race. Moreover, it is not possible to infer market discrimination
from discriminatory tastes of the average employer (cf. Becker 1957).
Correspondence studies provide a partial solution to the rst concern (see, for instance, Firth
1981, Esmail and Everington 1993, or Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004). Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan (2004) send almost 5,000 ctitious resumes with randomly assigned black- or white
sounding names to over 1,200 help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago. Ceteris paribus, white-
sounding names receive about 50% more callbacks. Yet, it remains unclear whether the marginal
(as opposed to the average) employer treats blacks and whites di?erently.
The approach we take in this paper combines aspects of the Mincerian and structural literatures.
Our empirical work is strongly guided by theory, but uncertainty over which form of discrimination
is generating the data leads us to eschew structurally estimating the parameters of our model.
Instead, the richness of our data permits reduced form estimation of parameters which are typically
structurally estimated such as arrival rates, reservation wages, or o?er distributions.
Ultimately, our contribution to the literature on labor market discrimination is three-fold: (i)
We provide the rst descriptive details of racial di?erences in search behavior from a large sample
of job seekers; (ii) we develop a novel empirical test which, under plausible conditions, provides
8There also exists a large (quasi-)experimental literatures on discrimination in housing and product markets. See
Riach and Rich (2002) for a useful review.
8
a lower bound on the extent of discrimination; and (iii) we show that the patterns in our data
are consistent with a search-matching model of the labor market in which employers statistically
discriminate based on race.9
3 A Search-Matching Model of the Labor Market
To guide our empirical work, this section outlines a simple search-matching model of the labor
market. The model is a discrete time simplication of Jovanovic (1979), along the lines of that
developed in Sargent (1987) and Prescott and Townsend (1980), with statistical discrimination.
First, we describe the case in which there are no racial di?erences and rms do not discriminate on
the basis of race. In the following subsection we briey describe how one introduces these features.
Let there be a unit mass of innitely lived individuals who are looking for work. Each period
unemployed workers and rms are randomly matched with probability ? ? (0? 1). An agent’s
marginal product is match-specic and denoted by ?.
Workers maximize the present discounted value of wages. But before a matched worker receives
an o?er, she and the rm observe a common noisy signal of her productivity, ? + ?? We assume
that ? and ? are independently and normally distributed random variables: ? ? ?
¡
?? ?2?
¢
, ? ?
?
³
0? ?2?
´
.10 Using Bayes rule, both the worker and the rm draw inferences about ?. That is,
conditional on having observed ?+?, ? is distributed normally with mean ? = ?
2
?
?2?+?2?
?+ ?
2
?
?2?+?2?
(? + ?)
and variance ?2?|?+? =
?2?
?2?+?2?
.
To simplify the analysis we assume that rms operate in a perfectly competitive market with
entry. Moreover, rms employ a constant returns to scale technology for which labor is the only
input. Consequently, each rm o?ers an initial wage ? = ? [?|? + ?], with the understanding that
in subsequent periods it will pay the worker its marginal product as it obtains more information
about ?. Jovanovic (1979) proves that this constitutes an equilibrium strategy–although there do
exist other equilibria.
Given this strategy of the rm, the worker must decide whether to accept the o?er and work
this period receiving ?, or to refuse and remain unemployed for one period with a chance of being
matched with another rm in the next one. If she accepts, her true productivity is revealed in the
9Our evidence is consistent with the ndings of List (2004) for the sportscard market. List (2004) conducts a
series of complementary eld experiments demonstrating that statistical as opposed to animus based discrimination
is the reason why minorities receive lower initial and nal o?ers in this market.
10One can show that the forthcoming results generalize if we dispense with the normality assumption and assume
that the wage is stochastically increasing in the signal (cf. Border 1996).
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subsequent period. After learning her marginal product, the rm o?ers to pay ? until the match is
exogenously terminated (which occurs with probability ? ? (0? 1) at the end of every period). The
worker then decides whether to accept or reject this o?er.
Let ? (?) denote the expected present value of wages of a worker whose marginal product is
known to be ? with certainty and who behaves optimally. If she accepts the rm’s o?er, the value
of the match is given by ? + ??? + (1? ?)?? (?), where ? ? (0? 1) is an exogenously determined
discount factor and ? denotes the expected present value of wages if unemployed. Workers who
reject the match are unemployed this period with the chance of being rematched in the next one.
Thus, we can write Bellman’s functional equation as
? (?) = max {? + ??? + (1? ?)?? (?) ? ?} .
This equation is graphed in Figure 1. It admits a solution of the familiar form:
? (?) =
?
?
?
?+???
1??(1??) for ? ? ??
? for ? ? ??
(1)
As is typical in these models, workers follow a reservation wage policy: accept o?ers ? ? ?? and
reject o?ers ? ? ??, where ?? solves
?? = (1? ?)?. (2)
Given the decision rule above, we now turn to the worker’s choice in the intermediate stage.
After being matched with a rm and having observed ? + ?, the worker has to decide whether to
accept a wage o?er ? and thereby retain the option value of learning ?. Let ? (?) be the expected
present value of wages of a worker who has an initial o?er ? in hand and who behaves optimally.
Then,
? (?) = max{? + ?
Z
?(?)?? (?|?? ?2?|?+?)? ?}?
where ? (?|?? ?2?+?) denotes the posterior cumulative distribution function of ?, conditional on
? + ?. Note that both ? and ?
R
?(?)?? (?|?? ?2?+?) are increasing in ?, whereas ? is constant.
Thus, workers again follow a reservation wage policy. The functional equation has the solution
? (?) =
?
?
?
? + ?
R
?(?)?? (?|?? ?2?|?+?) for ? ? ??
? for ? ? ??
, (3)
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and the reservation wage, ??, in the intermediate stage is implicitly dened by
?? + ?
Z
?(?)?? (?|??? ?2?+?) = ?. (4)
In equilibrium, the average accepted wage of workers in the intermediate stage is given by
?[?|? ? ??] =
R?
?? ???(?|?? ?2?)
1??(??|?? ?2?)
,
and that of tenured workers equals
? [?|? ? ??? ? ? ??] =
R?
??
R?
?? ??? (?|?? ?2?|?+?)??(?|?? ?2?)R?
??
R?
?? ?? (?|?? ?2?|?+?) ??(?|?? ?2?)
.
It is easy to verify that mean wages decrease when workers are willing to accept worse matches, i.e.
as reservation wages decline. In Appendix A, we show that ?? ? ??. Hence, on average wages rise
with tenure in the rm, whereas wages decrease as tenured workers lose their jobs and are being
rematched.
To close the model, the present discounted value of wages when unemployed is given by
? = ??
Z
? (?) ??(?|?? ?2?) + (1? ?)??, (5)
where ?(?|?? ?2?) denotes a normal cumulative distribution function with mean ? and variance
?2? ?
?4?
?2?+?2?
.
Equations (1), (3), and (5) determine the worker’s optimal policy.
Introducing Racial Di?erences
The model above generalizes straightforwardly to incorporate a variety of di?erences in worker
characteristics. Indeed, each parameter in the set {?? ?? ?? ?? ?2? ? ?2?} can vary by group identity.
Because of this, there are many potential avenues to introduce racial disparities in wages. Note,
if groups di?er on observable characteristics that are correlated with the parameters of the model,
then rms will treat each group of workers as if they belonged to a separate market of that type.
In particular, under the assumptions above it continues to be an equilibrium to pay each worker
her expected marginal product, given all available information (cf. Jovanovic 1979).11
11There exist many other equilibria. For instance, search frictions and the existence of market power may induce
rms to o?er lower wages to groups of workers with lower reservation wages (Black 1995). Without free entry and
a perfectly elastic supply of entrepreneurs, biased employers may trade o? prots for a desire to discriminate and
11
Disparities in the arrival rate of matches due, for example, to di?erences in search behavior or
discriminatory practices of rms can be captured by assuming that ?? ? ?? . This relationship is
reported in several audit studies in sociology and economics (e.g., Bendick et al. 1994, Pager 2003,
Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004). From equations (2) and (5) it is straightforward to show that
???
?? ? 0. That is, if blacks are less likely to receive job o?ers, then they also have lower reservation
wages and will accept worse matches. In equilibrium this results in racial wage gaps.
On the other hand, blacks and whites might be equally likely to obtain a match, but blacks
may be more likely to lose their job (see Fairlie and Kletzer 1998). Again, it is easy to show that
???
?? ? 0, which implies that increasing the chance of an exogenous separation lowers the reservation
wage. All else equal, this would result in lower wages for blacks. Moreover, disparities in arrival
and separation rates may lead to large racial di?erences in unemployment rates, as reported in
Stratton (1993).
Now, consider racial di?erences in the distribution of the match quality signal due to statistical
discrimination (Phelps 1972, Arrow 1973) or asymmetric screening technologies (Cornell and Welch,
1996, Lang 1986). In an Arrow (1973) model, the average of ? would di?er between blacks and
whites, which results in racial di?erences in initial wage o?ers. Conversely, in a Phelps (1972) or
Aigner and Cain (1977) framework, the variance of ? is larger for blacks than for whites. In this
case, employers put more weight on average group ability when evaluating blacks’ signals than
when inferring the ability of a white candidate. While this will not lead to mean di?erences in ? if
both groups are equally skilled, if ?? ? ?? then black workers will, on average, receive lower wage
o?ers than whites with the same signal. In either case, our model predicts the black-white wage
gap to converge with tenure in the rm, since workers of equal ability earn the same wage after
their true ability has been revealed. As shown in subsequent sections, this prediction is, indeed,
born out in the data.
survive in equilibrium. One could also assume a Nash bargaining solution to set wages as in Eckstein and Wolpin
(1999). In order to x ideas and keep focus on the core aspects of job search and learning, we choose to maintain the
simpler, more tractable–but admittedly less realistic–assumptions of Jovanovic (1979). The modelling exercise in
this paper is only designed to motivate the empirical work that follows.
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4 Data and Econometric Approach
4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The primary data set used in this paper was collected by the Princeton University Survey Research
Center (PSRC) during the fall of 2009 and early 2010.12 It is important to recognize that the
data were collected during a period of mass unemployment thereby lessening potiontial selection
problems into the pool of UI recipients (Gibbons and Katz 1991). Although we have do not have
compelling empirical evidence in favor of this assertion, it seems likely that layo?s during the 2009
recession were more random than during periods of a tight labor market.13
Starting from the universe of unemployment insurance (UI) recipients in the state of New Jersey
as of September 28, 2009, PSRC drew a stratied random sample of 63? 813 currently unemployed
individuals. The sampled population was then contacted by the New Jersey Department of Labor
and Workforce Development (LWD) and invited to participate in a condential web survey for a
period of 12 consecutive weeks.14
The survey consisted of an initial entry questionnaire and weekly follow-up interviews which
were remarkably rich. The former elicited information on demographics, previous employment, asset
holdings, and spouses’ employment status; whereas the latter inquired about job search activities,
time use, reservation wages, and job o?ers, among other topics. Participants were given the choice
of receiving an incentive payment of $20 within a few days of completing the entry questionnaire,
or $40 at the end of the 12 week survey period.
An important caveat to the data is that only 6? 025 (roughly 10%) of the sampled individuals
participated in the entry wave, and those who responded to the initial survey completed only
about 40 percent of weekly follow-ups. The likelihood of responding varies by race. The sample of
respondents consisted of 15?3% blacks (compared to 18?6% in the sample frame) and 68% of whites
(relative to 61?7% in the sample frame).15 Participants were more educated, more likely to be
female, and had higher previous earnings than the baseline population. Using rich administrative
12 In what follows we draw heavily on Krueger and Mueller (2011). For a comprehensive description of the sampling
and interviewing procedures the interested reader should consult their appendix.
13 In a seminal paper Gibbons and Katz (1991) argue that unemployed workers are negatively selected, and demon-
strate that wage losses following displacement are larger following layo?s than plant closings (which presumably pro-
vide little or no signal about worker ability). Recently, Hu and Taber (2011) have shown that this holds only among
white males, whereas blacks appear to su?er greater declines in wages following plant closings. Hu and Taber (2011)
rationalize this nding by appealing to heterogenous human capital.
14 Individuals who were unemployed for 60 weeks or longer at the beginning of the survey were later asked to
participate in an additional 12 weeks of interviewing–for a maximum of 24 weeks. In this paper, however, we restrict
attention to the rst 12 weeks for all respondents.
15See Table 2.1 in Krueger and Mueller (2011).
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data, Krueger and Mueller (2011) create sampling weights in order to adjust for the stratied
survey design as well as nonresponse. Comparing characteristics of respondents to the universe of
UI recipients along a number of dimensions — including those that were not used to construct the
weights (e.g. income, weekly exit rates from UI) — they conclude that the low response rate did
not signicantly skew the sample on observables. After applying sample weights, blacks make up
20% of the sample (compared to 20?8% in the universe of UI recipients) and whites make up 59?8%
(compared to 58?9%).
Throughout our analysis we use the weights created by Krueger and Mueller (2011), and follow
their coding of wages by dropping wage o?ers below $5 an hour and o?ers above $100 per hour.
Moreover, we restrict attention to respondents with non-missing information on race who are not
listed as previously self-employed–for a nal sample of 5? 251 individuals. Appendix B provides
additional detail on the construction of our sample as well as precise denitions of all variables.
Summary statistics for the variables used in our main specications are displayed, by race, in
Table 1, with ‘white’ referring solely to non-Hispanic whites. Our primary outcomes of interest are
o?ered wages and whether or not a job o?er was received. Each of the follow-up surveys asked
whether respondents had received any job o?er within the last 7 days, if so how many, and what
the wage associated with the best o?er was.
In any given week about 6?5% of job seekers receive at least one job o?er, and conditional upon
receiving any o?er approximately 84% of individuals are o?ered exactly one job. Blacks write 1?3
more applications per week than whites, but are slightly less likely to apply for white collar jobs.16
Interestingly, and in contrast to results in the audit study literature, blacks have 2?2 percentage
points higher arrival rates than whites — at least in the raw data. However, the mean o?ered hourly
wage for whites equals $23?4, far in excess of the $12?3 o?ered to blacks. And di?erences in the
distribution of wage o?ers, as shown in Figure 2, are stark. The modal job o?er is roughly the
same across racial groups, but the right tail of the white o?er distribution is signicantly larger. A
Kolmogrov-Smirnov test for equality in distributions is rejected at the 1%-level.
The remainder of Table 1 presents summary statistics for other variables used in our analysis.
About 45% of white, and 58% of black respondents are female. On average blacks are almost 7 years
younger than whites, and are much more likely to be single. Consistent with national patterns,
blacks in our sample are less educated than whites. For instance, about 32% of white respondents
16Pager and Pedulla (2011) report that blacks and whites apply to similar jobs, but blacks consider a greater range
of possibilities.
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report to have at least a college education, compared to 17% for blacks.17 Blacks have longer
ongoing unemployment spells than whites, earned almost $400 less per week on their previous job,
and accumulated substantially less tenure than whites. We also have data on the industry in which
an individual previously worked. Blacks are less likely than whites to have worked in construction
and manufacturing. Instead, they are more concentrated in education and health care services.18
4.2 Identifying Discrimination
Four important features of the data described above enable us to conduct a novel test for racial
discrimination: information on wage o?ers (as opposed to just accepted wages), search strategies
and intensities, administrative data on previous earnings, as well as timing (the data were collected
during a period of mass unemployment). The key idea of our test is that, under the null hypothesis
of no discrimination, wages will closely proxy marginal productivity. Hence, conditional on wage
on the previous job, there should be no racial di?erences in wage o?ers, as controlling for previous
wage implicitly accounts for the market valuation of all factors such ability, non-cognitive skills, etc.
which previous research treated as unobservable. Therefore, observing racial di?erences in wage
o?ers after accounting for previous earnings would lead us to reject the null of no discrimination.
More formally, let ???? denote the wage associated with the ?th job o?er to individual ? and
consider the data generating process
ln (????) = ?0 + ????0??0 + ? 0??0 + ?0?? + ???? , (6)
where ????? is an indicator variable for ?’s race, ?? are individual level covariates, ?? denotes ?’s
unobserved ability, and ???? is white noise.19 Note that, although race and skill level will generally
be correlated, if employers do not discriminate it must be the case that ?0 = 0.
Further assume that previous earnings, ??, are related to unobserved skill in the following sense:
?? = ? + ? ln (??) + ? 0?? + ???
17Compared to unemployed New Jerseyites in the 2009 American Community Survey or the 2010 March CPS,
respondents in our data report broadly similar educational attainment; although self-reported dropouts are somewhat
under-represented and individuals with an incomplete college education are over-represented. It is important to note
that the numbers pertaining to educational achievement in Table 1 do not match those in Table 2.1 of Krueger and
Mueller (2011). In order to compare the sample of survey respondents to the universe of UI recipients they convert
adminstrative data on years of schooling (for both populations) into ‘degrees’, but rely on self-reported educational
attainment throughout the rest of their analysis.
18Compared to the universe of UI recipients, construction workers are slightly under-represented in the weighted
data (Krueger and Mueller 2011).
19We assume that skills command positive returns. That is, ?0 ? 0?
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where ? 6= 0, ? [??] = 0, Cov(??? ??) = 0, and Cov (ln (??) ? ??) = 0. This assumption is fairly
benign, as one can always write unobserved skill as a linear combination of previous earnings and
individual level covariates. In this case, ?? corresponds to the least squares residual, which means
that ? [??] = 0, and Cov (ln (??) ? ??) = 0 are automatically satised. For ? 6= 0 to hold it needs to
be the case that even after controlling for ?? previous wages predict ability, as seems likely.20
With this framework in mind, we can formalize our test of discrimination.
Proposition 1 Let b???? denote the ordinary least squares estimate of ? in the empirical model
ln (????) = ? + ????0??+ ? 0?? + ? ln (??) + ????,
and suppose that the true data generating process is given by (6). If (i) Cov (?????? ????) = 0 and
(ii) Cov (?????? ??) ? 0? then plim b???? ? ?0.
Proof. See the Technical Appendix.
In words, the proposition implies that if assumptions (i) and (ii) hold one can reject the null
hypothesis of no discrimination whenever b???? is negative and statistically signicant.
It is important to note at the outset that the two identifying assumptions are not innocuous.
Assumption (ii) requires that, conditional on covariates, previous earnings do not systematically
overstate blacks’ true ability. If, for instance, blacks were subject to discrimination on their last job,
then they would earn less than equally skilled whites which implies that Cov (?????? ??) ? 0 and the
assumption holds. Yet, if blacks actually earned higher wages relative to their white counterparts,
say because previous earnings capture marginal productivity plus a diversity preference or whites
have signicantly more amenities that are not captured in previous wage, then Cov (?????? ??) ? 0
and our test will overstate the true amount of discrimination.21
Another potential violation of assumption (ii) arises from measurement error in wages. To see
this consider the extreme case in which wages are pure noise. If blacks have lower mean ability
than whites, then it will be the case that Cov (?????? ??) ? 0. More generally, assumption (ii) fails
whenever measurement error is severe enough for blacks to appear to get paid more on average
20 It is important to note that previous earnings, ??, will generally not follow the same data generating process as
wage o?ers, ??. For instance, workers might gain seniority, engage in additional training, or wages might rise with
tenure in the rm as new information about workers’ productivity arrives (cf. the model in Section 3). It would,
therefore, be incorrect to set previous wages equal to wage o?ers and rearrange equation (6) to recover ??.
21Adding controls which proxy for whether an individual had health insurance on their previous job does not alter
the forthcoming results.
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than their equally skilled white counterparts. In an attempt to mitigate this concern, we use
administrative data on previous earnings, which is likely much more accurate than the usual self-
reported kind.22 In fact, administrative information usually serves as the benchmark in evaluation
studies of various surveys (see, for instance, Rodgers et al. 1993, Bound et al. 1994, as well as the
discussion in Bound et al. 2001).
The rst assumption is that Cov (?????? ????) = 0; which is automatically satised if ???? is in
fact white noise. Intuitively, this assumption requires that, ceteris paribus, blacks and whites do not
systematically di?er in their search behavior and draw wage o?ers from a comparable sets of rms.
If, for instance, blacks are more likely than whites to receive o?ers from rms particularly hard hit
by the 2009 recession–potentially because blacks are more concentrated in low level occupations–
then this assumption might be violated. Similarly, assumption (i) might fail if whites have lower
discount rates and rms’ adjust their o?ers accordingly, or if blacks do not bargain as aggressively
over o?ers as whites.
In contrast to the second assumption, however, assumption (i) is partially testable. Exploiting
the richness of our data we can account for racial di?erences in search strategies, search intensity,
geographic location, industry and occupation, bargaining behavior, as well as discounting. Although
there is little indication that di?erences along these lines explain our ndings, we urge the reader
to keep these caveats in mind when interpreting the results presented below.
5 Racial Disparities in Job Finding and O?ered Wages
5.1 Main Result
Table 2 presents a series of estimates of racial disparities in o?ered wages. The coe?cients therein
correspond to the following empirical model:
ln (????) = ????0??+ ? 0?? + ? ln (??) + ???? . (7)
All regressions include a full set of race indicators, with ‘white’ serving as the omitted category.
Consequently, the coe?cients on race capture the gap between the named racial category and
whites. Our primary emphasis, however, is on the black-white wage gap. The vector of other
covariates included in the specication, denoted by ??, varies across columns in Table 2. As one
22Separately, Table C.8 in the appendix shows that our results are qualitatively robust to a specication that
restricts the coe?cient on previous wage to be equal to one, which provides some evidence against this concern.
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moves to the right, the set of covariates steadily grows. In all instances is the estimation carried
out using weighted least squares with weights corresponding to the sampling weights calculated by
Krueger and Mueller (2011). Standard errors are clustered by individual to account for the fact
that some job seekers receive more than one o?er during the survey period.23
The rst column in Table 2 displays racial di?erences in o?ered wages after controlling for age
and gender. The ‘raw’ black-white di?erence is estimated to equal ??404 log points, or approx-
imately 33%. Accounting for racial disparities in formal education reduces the gap by ?118 log
points; but it remains economically large and statistically signicant.
These estimates are somewhat larger than that those obtained from commonly used data sets
such as the CPS, or the NLSY79. Note, however, that the estimates in Table 2 refer to wage o?ers
as opposed to actual wages. The search model in Section 3 predicts that, depending on arrival rates
and the shape of the wage o?er distribution, racial di?erences in accepted wages may be smaller
or larger than that in o?ers. For completeness, Table C.1 in the appendix displays estimates for
accepted wages in the NJ UI data.24
Column (3) adds Log Previous Weekly Earnings to the set of controls.25 As evidenced by the
stark increase in ?2, previous earnings are a very good predictor of o?ered wages. Importantly,
controlling for previous earnings almost halves the di?erence in o?ered wages between blacks and
whites. However, with ??169 log points the gap does remain economically large and statistically
signicant. On a purely descriptive level these results imply that blacks su?er a greater decline in
wages after being laid o?; and under the identifying assumptions of our approach, we can reject
the null hypothesis of no discrimination.
Yet, so far it is unclear whether assumptions (i) and (ii) do, indeed, hold. In particular it is
questionable whether blacks and whites receive job o?ers from a comparable set of rms, especially
during the 2009 recession whose impact di?ered greatly by industry. To address this concern, the
last two columns in Table 2 add controls for duration of unemployment, the reason why the last job
ended, and previous industry xed e?ects. While these factors are correlated with o?ered wages,
the racial gaps remain almost unchanged. After controlling for previous earnings and the full set of
23Due to the small sample size in the NJ UI data we pool males and females in our main regressions. For a detailed
set of results di?erentiated by gender see Appendix C. Broadly summarizing, estimates of the black-white wage gap
are qualitatively similar for males and females, but much more precise for the latter.
24Since only a relativly small number of individuals nd jobs during the survey period, the estimates in Table C.1
may be subject to potentially important selection bias.
25Since we have administrative data on average weekly earnings during the previous year, but only self-reported
information on hours on the last job (which are reported to have “varied” in many cases), we choose to control for
previous weekly earnings instead of hourly wages. Our main results are qualitatively and quantitatively robust to
controling for previous hourly wages instead.
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covariates, the di?erence in wage o?ers between blacks and whites in the NJ UI data equals ??160
log points, or 14?7%, and is statistically highly signicant. Thus, if the assumptions in Proposition
1 hold, then we estimate a lower bound on the impact of discrimination of almost 40% of the raw
gap.26
In order to demonstrate that this result is not an artifact of our data from the state of New Jersey,
Table 3A present estimates similar to those in Table 2 obtained from the nationally representative
Displaced Workers Survey (DWS) — a biannual supplement to the CPS administered to workers
who lost their job during the previous three years; and Table 3B does so for the NLSY79.27 Note,
however, that we do not observe wage o?ers in these data sets, and must therefore rely on accepted
wages instead. Nevertheless, the same basic pattern as in the NJ UI data emerges. Controlling for
earnings on the respondent’s previous job substantially reduces racial disparities, but the black-
white gap remains statistically signicant and economically large–approximately 15?6% in the
DWS and about 8% in the NLSY79.28
As an additional robustness check, Table C.1 in the appendix explores the sensitivity of our
results across a variety of specications. Column (1) contains our main result and is identical to
column 5 of Table 2. Column (2) adds a quadratic in previous wage as an additional covariate. The
third column alters the outcome to be the best o?er an individual receives (rather than including all
o?ers), and we investigate racial di?erences in accepted (rather than o?ered) wages in column (4).
Our next specication check uses the nearest neighbor matching estimator in Abadie and Imbens
(2002), which provides a more exible way of controlling for our set of covariates. In column
(6), we allow ? to di?er by race and estimate the racial gap by assuming that blacks have white
coe?cients (Oaxaca 1973). Across these specications, the results are similar, but large standard
errors make inference challenging. The black coe?cient ranges from -.227 (.031) for the matching
estimator to -.107 (.068) when we use accepted wage. In half the cases, imprecision prohibits us
from distinguishing the coe?cient on our robustness tests from the baseline result in column (1) or
zero.
Finally, one might be worried that our results are driven my measurement error or mean re-
26Lang and Manove (2011) nd almost no racial di?erences in wages at the top of the skill distribution. While we
have tried interacting previous earnings with race, our results are not precise enough to draw any conclusions about
whether racial di?erences in o?ered wages are smaller or larger among previously highly paid individuals.
27See Appendix B for a description of these data.
28Our specications using the NSLY79 also control AFQT scores. The fact that we still observe sizable di?erences
by race rules out the possibility that our results are driven by the possibility that less skilled workers su?er greater
wage penalties upon losing their jobs and that skill is negatively correlated with being black.
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version in wages.29 A simple way to address this issue is to restrict the coe?cient on previous
wage to equal one. If measurement error or mean reversion were, indeed, driving our results one
would expect the coe?cient on race in the specication to equal zero. The result is presented in
column (7). The coe?cient on black decreases 0?049 log points (to ?0?111) and the standard error
increases by more than 50% which leaves the black coe?cient economically large but statistically
insignicant. It is unclear whether the di?erences between column (1) and column (7) of Table C.1
are due to true measurement error in the wages reported to the New Jersey Department of Labor
and Workforce Development or imposing restrictions on the data that are not warranted.30
5.2 A Partial Test of the Identifying Assumptions
In this subsection we turn to the assumptions in Proposition 1. Recall, for our approach to identify a
lower bound on the impact of discrimination it needs to be the case that (i) blacks and whites do not
systematically di?er in their search behavior, search intensity, discount rates, the markets in which
they search, and so on, i.e. Cov (?????? ????) = 0; and (ii) previous wages do not systematically
overstate blacks’ true ability, i.e. Cov (?????? ??) ? 0.
Assumption (ii) is not directly testable with our data. If previous wage equals marginal product,
then this assumption holds and our approach will correctly identify racial discrimination. If previ-
ous wage is a function of both productivity and di?erential treatment by race, then our approach
will provide a lower bound on the impact of discrimination. Conversely, if previous wage captures
marginal product plus a diversity preference, the e?ect of a?rmative action, or signicant mea-
surement error in wages (e.g., mean reversion, unmeasured amenities, and so on), then assumption
two is violated and we will overstate the amount of discrimination in the market.31
By contrast, assumption (i) is testable. Guided heavily by the model in Section 3, we explore
29We are grateful to Joseph Altonji and David Card for making this point.
30A further test of our approach is to see whether variables known to inuence wages but are not related to
information have a coe?cient close to zero after controlling for previous earnings. One such variable is age. While age
is an important predictor of wages in columns (1)-(3) of Table 2, once we control for previous wage the coe?cients
on age and its square are nearly zero and relatively precisely estimated. This is not the case for our measures
of educational attainment. Note, however, that if the market posseses more information about college than high
school graduates (see Arcidiacono et al. 2010), then one might expect there to be wage di?erentials by educational
attainment, even conditional on previous wage. The fact that the coe?cients on educational attainment do decline,
but don’t fall to zero after controlling for previous earnings, is thus consistent with a model of statistical discrimination.
We are grateful to Kevin Lang for suggesting this test of our approach.
31 It is unlikely that diversity preferences or a?rmative action can explain our results, as our estimates are signi-
cantly larger than conventional estimates of the impact of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, a?rmative action, or the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 (e.g., Ashenfelter and Heckman 1976, Heckman and Payner 1989, Chay 1998, Leonard 1984a,
1984b, 1990, and Smith and Welch 1984, among others). While some industries have seen large relative improvements
of blacks, in particular with respect to employment (see Heckman and Payner 1989 or McCrary 2007), the impact of
a?rmative action on the labor market as a whole has been much more limited.
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ve plausible violations of this assumption: spatial mismatch, racial di?erences in search behavior,
search strategies, bargaining, as well as discount rates. This constitutes only a partial test, given
there may be other factors leading to a positive correlation between ????? and ???? which we do
not observe in our data.
Spatial Mismatch
Table 4 probes whether di?erences in the geographic location of blacks and whites across New
Jersey can explain the estimated wage gaps (e.g., Cutler and Glaeser 1997, Jencks and Mayer
1990, Kain 1968, Holzer 1991). For instance, if blacks live in blighted neighborhoods with few
high paying jobs, then this may lead them to draw wage o?ers from a di?erent set of rms, and
reconcile why, even conditional on previous earnings, they are o?ered lower wages. While a priori
plausible — particularly during a period of mass unemployment such as the 2009 recession — the
spatial mismatch theory receives only scant support in the data.
We test for the impact of spatial mismatch in two ways. First, we control for the distance that
respondents report traveling to search for a job to proxy for searching in similar markets (recall,
we also include industry xed e?ects). Second, we include metropolitan area xed e?ects.32 In
both cases, the coe?cient on black is not greatly a?ected — adding controls for distance traveled
to search increases the coe?cient on black to ?0?179 (?057) and adding xed e?ects reduces it to
??152 (?065).
Search Intensity
Next, we turn to racial di?erences in search behavior. Table 5 displays estimates of equation
(7) in which the outcome variable has been replaced with proxies of search intensity. These include:
whether a respondent was actively looking for a job within the last week, the total number of hours
she spent searching along with twelve categories detailing how they spent their time, the number of
jobs applied to, and whether she received any job o?er. For each outcome we estimate ‘raw’ racial
di?erences accounting only for gender and age (left column), as well as gaps controlling for the full
set of covariates including previous earnings (right column).
Taking the point estimates at face value, blacks are 2?7 percentage points more likely to be
looking for work during the last seven days, spend 1?5 hours more per week searching, write an
additional 1?3 applications, and are consequently about 2 percentage point more likely to receive a
job o?er. Although these di?erences are in most cases not very precisely estimated, we are able to
32Given only 114 blacks receive a job o?er in our sample, county xed e?ects are too demanding for the data.
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rule out moderately sized gaps in favor of whites. Interestingly, blacks are signicantly more likely
to report contacting employers directly, contacting public employment agencies, and using informal
networks. Thus, if anything, unemployed blacks appear to search more intensely for work across a
variety of channels and generate more o?ers than their white counterparts.
Search Strategies
Racial di?erences in search strategies are investigated in Table 6. For the sake of brevity we
restrict attention to six outcomes: whether the respondent did not apply to a job ad she saw within
the last seven days, whether she didn’t apply because the job was too far away, whether she applied
to any white collar jobs, any blue collar ones, or any service jobs, and whether she accepted an
o?er.33
Broadly summarizing, the evidence in Table 6 does not reveal signicant di?erences in search
strategies between blacks and whites. For instance, blacks appear to be only slightly more likely
than whites to ignore job ads, and are even less likely than whites to do so due to transportation
di?culties. Moreover, after controlling for a host of individual characteristics (including previous
earnings and previous industry) there are almost no di?erences in the types of jobs to which blacks
and whites apply, although in the ‘raw’ data blacks are signicantly less likely to apply to white
collar jobs. There is one exception however. Blacks are estimated to be more likely to accept an
o?er in hand–even after controlling for previous wages. Although this di?erence is non-trivial in
magnitude, it is not statistically signicant due to large standard errors.
Bargaining and Discount Rates
Estimates of racial di?erences in bargaining and a proxy for discount rates are presented in
Table 7. The two columns on the left show that after adjusting for only age and gender, blacks
are approximately 11 percentage points less likely to negotiate wages conditional on being o?ered
a job. Yet, upon including our full set of covariates this di?erence halves and becomes statistically
insignicant.
As part of the initial survey, respondents were asked whether they prefer to receive a $20 Visa
gift card within a few days or a $40 one in 12 weeks. The two columns on the right of Table 7
uses respondents’ actual choice as an admittedly crude proxy for discount rates.34 As evidenced by
33Results from other variables that proxy for search strategies are available from the authors upon request.
34 It is not entirely clear whether the choice between a $20 gift card within a few days or a $40 dollar one in 12
weeks elicits only time preferences, or whether issues of trust etc. also play a role–despite reassurement that the
respondent would receive the gift card even if he didn’t participate in any of the follow-up surveys.
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point estimates of 22 and 15?6 percentage points, blacks are substantially more likely than whites
to opt for $20 now–suggesting that di?erences in time preferences may explain part of the gap, at
least if employers take these into account when making job o?ers.35
Understanding the Impact of Search Strategies, Search Intensity, Bargaining, and Discount Rates
Table 8 provides a concise summary of the e?ect of each of the ve potential violations of
assumption (i). The estimates shown in the table correspond to the coe?cient on ?????, i.e. ? in
specication (7), and denote racial di?erences in o?ered wages relative to whites. If assumption
(i) does indeed hold, then adding additional controls for each of the outcomes investigated above
should not decrease the gap in a statistically meaningful way.
The rst column displays racial di?erences after accounting for the set of covariates used in
Table 2. Each subsequent column controls for one or more of the di?erent dimensions of search
behavior explored in Tables 4—7. For instance, the second column also includes controls for whether
the respondent was looking for work during the last week, how many hours she spent searching,
and the number of applications she wrote. The third column adds indicator variables for whether
she didn’t apply to any job ad she saw within the last week, whether she did so because the job was
too far away, as well as whether she applied to a job opening in any of 22 Standard Occupational
Classication (SOC) Major Groups.
Despite the richness of the included covariates, the residual black-white di?erence in wage o?ers
remains almost una?ected. Separately accounting for the e?ect of search intensity, search strategies,
bargaining, time preferences, or geographic location reduces the gap by at most ?033 log points–
compared to a standard error of ?060. Even after jointly controlling for all of these factors, job o?ers
to blacks are still estimated to be ?160 log points lower than those to observationally equivalent
whites.36
In sum, under the identifying assumptions of Proposition 1, we can conclude that discrimination
accounts for at least one third of the black-white wage gap.
6 Evidence Consistent with a Search-Matching Model
Recall, the search matching model in Section 3 has three stages. In the rst stage unemployed
workers are stochastically matched with rms. After observing a productivity signal the rm o?ers
35Note, however, that such behavior might in itself be considered discriminatory.
36This di?erence is strikingly similar in size to that reported in Lang and Manove (2011) for the NLSY79 after
controlling for education and AFQT.
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a worker her expected marginal product, and the worker decides whether or not to accept the o?er.
If she declines, she remains unemployed, but has a chance of being rematched in subsequent periods.
If the worker accepts, she works for one period, and in the following period both the worker and
the rm learn the true productivity of their match. Firms then o?er a worker her match-specic
marginal product. The worker decides whether to continue the employment relationship (until an
exogenous separation occurs), or to enter unemployment and search for a better match.
As explained above, there are several ways to introduce racial di?erences into this framework.
If, for instance, blacks are on average less skilled than whites, i.e. ?? ? ?? (as documented by
Neal and Johnson 1996, among others), then group membership constitutes a valuable signal of
ability, and unemployed black workers will, on average, be o?ered lower initial wages than equally
qualied whites. In symbols, ?[?? ] ? ?[??].
There are three additional predictions of the model which are testable in our data. First, similar
to Black (1995), statistical discrimination in a search framework yields a lower reservation wage
for the disadvantaged group. Second, our model predicts the black-white wage gap to narrow
with tenure in the rm. Third, if blacks are signicantly more likely than whites to experience
separations (as argued in Kletzer 1998), then aggregate wage gaps across rms will increase with
labor market experience. Below, we explore the extent to which these predictions are borne out in
the data.
Racial Di?erences in Reservation Wages
Table 9 presents evidence on racial di?erences in reservation wages (see Holzer 1986 for earlier
evidence). Reservation wages are gleaned from a question which asks, “Suppose someone o?ered
you a job today, what is the lowest wage or salary you would accept (before deductions) for the
type of work you are looking for.”37 It is important to note that di?erences in reservation wages
need not necessarily be due to discriminatory hiring practices. Instead, they might simply reect
racial di?erences in discount rates or savings that could be used to smooth consumption while
unemployed (Chetty 2008).
The rst column in Table 9 shows that, after accounting for age and gender, blacks are willing
to accept substantially lower o?ers than whites. The gap in reservation wages with these baseline
controls equals ??232 log points. Accounting for educational achievement reduces the di?erence
37Krueger and Mueller (2011) report that whites are more likely than blacks to accept wage o?ers below their
stated reservation wage, which could be due to a variety of factors such as misinterpretation of the survey question
or individuals adjusting their reservation wage as they search.
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to ??160 log points, but it remains statistically signicant. Similar to wage o?ers, earnings on
the previous job are a very good predictor of reservation wages. Moving from the second to the
third column ?2 increases from ?323 to ?549, and reduces the black coe?cient to ??067 (.028).
Put di?erently, on average, blacks are willing to accept almost 7% lower wages than whites who
previously earned just as much. Adding additional controls for the duration of unemployment, the
reason the last job ended, or previous industry xed e?ects, does little to alter this result.
Returns to Tenure Within Firms
In our model, if blacks have lower mean pre-market skill this results in lower intermediate stage
wages for blacks. Over time, however, employers learn workers’ true marginal product which results
in no wage di?erences among equally productive tenured individuals. This provides a testable
prediction: within the rm, racial di?erences in wages should narrow with tenure.
Empirical evidence in support of this prediction is presented in Table 10. Using the NJ UI
data the table displays estimates of our empirical specication in which the outcome variable has
been replaced with the natural logarithm of previous earnings. Additionally, we control for tenure
on the previous job and interact it with race. As predicted, wages rise with tenure for all racial
groups. More importantly, however, blacks have a 1?1 percentage points higher return to tenure
than whites. Not only does the black-white di?erence in the return to tenure carry the expected
sign, it is also highly statistically signicant.
A potential confounding factor of the above approach is that blacks are more likely than whites
to have short tenure and, as Topel (1991) shows, the returns to tenure are heavily weighted to
the rst years on a job. Thus, the above analysis could be confusing non-linearities in the returns
to tenure as evidence in favor of the model. To test this possibility we divided tenure into four
categories: less than 2.5 years of experience, 2.5 to 5, 5 to 10, and more than 10 years. Interestingly,
the returns to tenure seem to be driven by black workers in the 10 or more years category.
Aggregate Racial Gaps Across Firms
In stark contrast to the previous discussion, when workers who have been with the same rm
for a su?ciently long time lose their job, the black-white wage gap re-emerges when these workers
are matched with a new rm. Thus, if blacks are su?ciently more likely than whites to incur a
separation, the black-white wage gap will increase with labor market experience. Altonji and Pierret
(2001) demonstrate that racial di?erences are small when workers just enter the labor market, but
widen with potential experience (see also Oettinger 1996).
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Table 11 augments Altonji and Pierret’s (2001) original analysis of the NLSY79. The total
number of observations in Altonji and Pierret (2001) is 21,058 while that in our sample is 21,026.
This small di?erence is due to missing information on wages in the work history le of the NLSY79.
Nevertheless, our estimates are almost identical to theirs. For a detailed description of the sample
construction procedures see Appendix B, or the Data Appendix in Altonji and Pierret (2001).
Using data for the time period from 1979—92, columns (1)—(4) replicate the upper panel of their
Table 1. The negative coe?cient on the interaction term between black and potential experience
indicates that the black-white wage widens by roughly 1% per year of experience.
In column (5) we extend Altonji and Pierret (2001) by adding tenure and its interaction with
race to the set of covariates. As predicted by our theory, blacks experience a 1?1 percentage points
higher return to tenure than whites. Not only is the di?erence statistically signicant, it is also
surprisingly close to our estimate from the NJ UI data. The remainder of the table shows that this
result is robust to including additional years of data, and does not depend on Altonji and Pierret’s
(2001) choice to control for a cubic time trend interacted with black. Although the black-white
wage gap increases as individuals change employers and accumulate labor market experience, it is
estimated to be substantially smaller among those who have been with the same rm for a long
time.
7 Discussion
To conclude our analysis, we explore the extent to which discrimination based on animus or di?er-
ences in pre-market skills can account for our set of facts: (1) blacks incur larger losses than whites
with job separations; (2) blacks have lower reservation wages; and (3) blacks garner higher returns
to tenure in a rm.
Taste-Based Discrimination
Discriminatory tastes of employers, co-workers, or customers can give rise to black-white wage
di?erences (Becker 1957). If, for instance, some fraction of employers incurs disutility from inter-
acting with black workers, then the wage o?ered to blacks must be lower than that of whites in
order for the employer to be indi?erent. In equilibrium, the marginal discriminator determines the
black-white wage gap. Similar arguments apply when customers or co-workers discriminate based
on animus.38
38 In a rare empirical test of this theory Charles and Guryan (2008) argue that animus accounts for about one
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The simplest models of taste-based discrimination can rationalize equilibrium wage gaps, but
have di?culty explaining why, after loosing their job, blacks are o?ered lower wages than previously
equally well paid whites. Unless the marginal discriminator changes during the year our data were
collected, controlling for previous earnings should eliminate the black-white wage gap — even in a
world where taste-based discrimination is present. This is inconsistent with what we nd in the
data.
In contrast to neoclassical models of the labor market, models that include search frictions
such as Black (1995) predict that minorities will, on average, be paid lower wages as long as any
discriminatory employer is in the market. Expecting discrimination, blacks have lower reservation
wages than whites. Moreover, in a world with signicant job specic human capital investment,
blacks may incur larger losses than white from job separations and have higher returns to tenure.
The key to this explanation is that blacks have more incentives to invest in rm specic human
capital because the market provides less insurance than it does for equally skilled whites.
Thus, our set of facts are consistent with a taste-based model of discrimination in which there
is substantial rm specic human capital investment. Lacking information on such investments, we
are unable to distinguish between taste-based and statistical avors of discrimination.
Racial Di?erences in Pre-Market Factors
A separate strand of the literature relies on disparities in pre-market factors such as education
and skill to explain racial wage gaps.39 For instance, O’Neill (1990) as well as Neal and Johnson
(1996) show that after controlling for AFQT scores–which presumably measure skill prior to entry
into the labor market–the black-white wage di?erence in the NLSY79 narrows substantially or
even reverses. This theory nds mixed support in our data.
Racial di?erences in pre-market factors can explain racial di?erences in reservation wages. And,
to the extent that the price of skill increases with labor market experience or skill gaps widen with
labor market experience, then racial di?erences in pre-market factors can also explain why aggregate
wage gaps increase with age. Indeed, Altonji and Pierret (2001) demonstrate that the importance
of AFQT increases with labor market experience (see Table 11).
To explain why blacks incur a higher wage penalty from job separations than whites, one must
assume that there is a signicant amount of rm specic investment among workers with low pre-
quarter of the observed black-white wage gap.
39 It is theoretically unclear whether disparities in pre-market factors cause racial wage gaps, or whether the latter
lead minorities to invest less and thereby cause the former (see Lundberg and Startz 1983, or Coate and Loury 1993
for equilibrium analyses).
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market skills. Moreover, a pre-market theory predicts that, conditional on AFQT, there are no
racial di?erences in the returns to tenure. This prediction is at odds with the data. Columns
(7) and (8) in Table 11 reveal that, conditional AFQT, blacks have signicantly higher returns to
tenure than whites. Without controlling for AFQT, blacks have 1?1 percentage point higher returns
to tenure. Accounting for AFQT increases the coe?cient to 1?2 percentage points.40 Given these
data, it is unlikely that pre-market factors alone explain the patterns in our data; although racial
di?erences in pre-market factors are likely important determinants of black-white inequality, and
may even give rise to statistical discrimination.
A Note on Statistical Discrimination and the Return to Education
Neal (2006) describes an important critique regarding the empirical content of models of statis-
tical discrimination, as developed by Arrow (1973) and Coate and Loury (1993). In these models,
blacks anticipate discrimination in the labor market and, expecting this, invest less in skills than
whites. Empirically, however, many have shown that the return to investment in skills is, if any-
thing, higher for blacks than whites which is inconsistent with simple versions the theory (e.g., see
Neal and Johnson 1996).
While we do not explicitly model investment in skills, there are several viable ways to incorporate
this critique into our theory. Generally, it is important to note that the return to education is
determined at the margin. That is, just because statistical discrimination causes blacks to earn on
average lower wages, does not necessarily mean that the function mapping educational investment
into earnings must be atter. In equilibrium it will be the case that the gross return on investment
equals individuals’ opportunity cost (Becker 1962, 1993). Hence, if blacks are more likely to be cash
constrained or face higher cost of investing, then this alone may give rise to statistical discrimination
and explain higher estimated payo?s–assuming decreasing marginal returns.
More specically, blacks may experience weakly higher returns on investment if education re-
duces the variance in the signal to employers (for empirical evidence see Arcidiacono et al. 2010);
which is, in fact, the assumption that drives the model in Lang and Manove (2011). In their analy-
sis blacks ‘overinvest’ in education to signal their (unobserved) ability. If ? depends not only on
group investments, but also on environmental factors such as school or neighborhood quality, then
in equilibrium it might well be the case that ?? ? ?? , despite higher returns for blacks.
An alternative way to rationalize higher returns for blacks is to assume that educational attain-
40Accounting for non-linearities in the returns to tenure by including years on the job in four categories, does not
alter this result.
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ment decreases the probability of job loss (e.g., Kletzer 1998). In this case blacks would experience
a higher return to education than whites because it shields them from costly job losses.
***
The racial wage gap is a robust empirical regularity. Simple comparisons of mean wages typically
nd black-white wage di?erences in excess of 30%. While there exists almost unanimous consensus
that di?erences in formal schooling and pre-market skill are important determinants of the observed
disparities, the extent to which discrimination contributes to the gap remains one of the most
debated issues in the social sciences.
In this paper we develop a novel test for the presence of discrimination using a newly available
dataset. Results from this test suggest that the impact of racial discrimination on o?ered wages
is at least one third of the raw black-white wage gap in our data — subject to our identifying
assumptions.
Taking our estimates at face value, labor market discrimination appears to be an impediment
to racial income equality. This suggests that alleviating racial inequality may take a combination
of policies to both eliminate barriers to investing in education and other premarket skills as well as
anti-discrimination enforcement so that minorities are rewared for those skills.
References
[1] Abadie, Alberto, and Guido W. Imbens (2002). “Simple and bias-corrected matching estima-
tors.” Unpublished Manuscript. University of California, Berkeley.
[2] Altonji, Joseph G., and Rebecca M. Blank (1999). “Race and Gender in the Labor Market,”
(pp. 3143—3259) in Orley C. Ashenfelter and David Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Eco-
nomics, Vol. 3, Amsterdam: Elsevier
[3] Altonji, Jospeh G., and Charles R. Pierret (2001). “Employer Learning and Statistical Dis-
crimination,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 313—350.
[4] Aigner, Dennis J., Glen G. Cain (1977). “Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor
Markets,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 30, 175—187.
[5] Arcidiacono, Peter, Patrick Bayer, and Aurel Hizmo (2010). “Beyond Signaling and Human
Capital: Education and the Revelation of Ability,” American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics, 2, 76—104.
[6] Arrow, Kenneth J. (1973). “The Theory of Discrimination,” (pp. 3—33) in Orley C. Ashen-
felter and Albert Rees (eds.), Discrimination in Labor Markets, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
29
[7] Ashenfelter, Orley C., and James J. Heckman (1976). “Measuring the E?ect of an Antidiscrim-
ination Program,” in Orley C. Ashenfelter and James Blum (eds.), Evaluating the Labor
Market E?ects of Social Programs, Princeton, NJ: Industrial Relations Section.
[8] Ayres, Ian, and Peter Siegelman (1995). “Gender and Race Discrimination in Bargaining for
a New Car,” American Economic Review, 85, 304—321.
[9] Becker, Gary S. (1957). The Economics of Discrimination. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
[10] Becker, Gary S. (1962). “Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis,” Journal of
Political Economy, 70, 9—49.
[11] Becker, Gary S. (1993). Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special
Reference to Education. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[12] Bendick, Marc, Charles W. Jackson, and Victor A. Reinoso (1994). “Measuring Employment
Discrimination through Controlled Experiments,” Review of Black Political Economy, 23,
25—48.
[13] Bertrand, Marianne and Sendhil Mullainathan (2004) “Are Emily and Greg More Employable
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination,” American
Economic Review, 94, 991—1013.
[14] Black, Dan A. (1995). “Discrimination in an Equilibrium Search Model,” Journal of Labor
Economics, 13, 309—334.
[15] Black, Dan A., Natalia Kolesnikova, Seth G. Sanders, and Lowell J. Taylor (2010). “The Role
of Location in Evaluating Racial Wage Disparity,” Unpublished Manuscript, University of
Chicago.
[16] Blau, Francine D, and Andrea H. Beller (1992). “Black-White Earnings Over the 1970s and
1980s: Gender Di?erences in Trends,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 74, 276—286.
[17] Blendon, Robert J., Linda H. Aiken, Howard E. Freeman, and Christopher R. Corey (1989).
“Access to Medical Care for Black and White Americans,” Journal of the American Medical
Association, 261, 278—281.
[18] Blinder, Alan S. (1973) “Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural Estimates,”
Journal of Human Resources, 8, 435-455.
[19] Border, Kim (1996). “Partial Notes on a Simple Matching Model.” mimeo. California Institute
of Technology.
[20] Bound, John, Charles Brown, Greg J. Duncan, and Willard L. Rodgers (1994). “Evidence on
the Validity of Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Labor Market Data,” Journal of Labor
Economics, 12, 345—368.
[21] Bound, John, Charles Brown, and Nancy Mathiowetz (2001). “Measurement error in survey
data,” (pp. 3705—3843) in James J. Heckman and Edward E. Leamer (eds.), Handbook of
Econometrics, Vol. 5, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
[22] Bowlus, Audra J. and Zvi Eckstein (2002). “Discrimination and Skill Di?erences in an Equi-
librium Search Model,” International Economic Review, 43, 1—38.
[23] Carneiro, Pedro, James J. Heckman, and Dimitriy V. Masterov (2005). “Labor Market Dis-
crimination and Racial Di?erences in Premarket Factors,” Journal of Law and Economics,
48, 1—39.
30
[24] Charles, Kerwin K., and Jonathan Guryan (2008). “Prejudice and Wages: An Empirical As-
sessment of Becker’s The Economics of Discrimination,” Journal of Political Economy, 116,
773—809.
[25] Charles, Kerwin K., and Jonathan Guryan (2011). “Studying Discrimination: Fundamental
Challenges and Recent Progress,” fortcoming in Annual Review of Economics.
[26] Chay, Kenneth Y. (1998). “The Impact of Federal Civil Rights Policy on Black Economic
Progress: Evidence from the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,” Industrial and
Labor Relations Review, 51, 608—632.
[27] Chetty, Raj (2008). “Moral Hazard vs. Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance,”
Journal of Political Economy, 116, 173—234.
[28] Coate, Stephen, and Glenn C. Loury (1993). “Will A?rmative-Action Policies Eliminate Neg-
ative Stereotypes?” American Economic Review, 83, 1220—1240.
[29] Coleman, James S. (1966). “Equality of Educational Opportunity.” US Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, O?ce of Education.
[30] Cooper, Richard S., Joan F. Kennelly, Ramon Durazo-Arvizu, Hyun-Joo Oh, George Kaplan,
and John Lynch (2001). “Relationship between Premature Mortality and Socioeconomic
Factors in Black and White Populations of US Metropolitan Areas,” Public Health Reports,
116, 464—473.
[31] Corcoran, Mary and Greg J. Duncan (1979) “Work History, Labor Force Attachment, and
Earnings Di?erences between the Races and Sexes,” Journal of Human Resources, 14,
3—20.
[32] Cornell, Bradford, and Ivo Welch (1996). “Culture, Information, and Screening Discrimina-
tion,” Journal of Political Economy, 104, 542—571.
[33] Cutler, David M., and Edward L. Glaeser (1997). “Are Ghettos Good or Bad?” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 112, 827-872.
[34] Darity, William A, and Patrick L. Mason (1998). “Evidence on Discrimination in Employment:
Codes of Color, Codes of Gender,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12, 63—90.
[35] Duncan, Greg J., Jeanna Brooks-Gunn, and Pamela K. Klebanov (1994). “Economic Depriva-
tion and Early Childhood Development,” Child Development, 65, 296—318.
[36] Greg J. Duncan (1999). Consequences of Growing Up Poor. New York: Russell Sage Founda-
tion.
[37] Eckstein, Zvi and Kenneth I. Wolpin (1999).“Estimating the E?ect of Racial Discrimination
on First Wage Job O?ers,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 81, 384—392.
[38] Esmail, Aneez, and Everington Sam (1993). “Racial Discrimination Against Doctors from
Ethnic Minorities,” British Medical Journal, 306, 691—692.
[39] Fairlie, Robert W., and Lori G. Kletzer (1998). “Jobs Lost, Jobs Regained: An Analysis
of Black/White Di?erences in Job Displacement in the 1980s,” Industrial Relations, 37,
460—477.
[40] Firth, Michael (1981). “Racial Discrimination in British Labour Market,” Industrial and Labor
Relations Review, 34, 265—272.
[41] Frisch, Ragnar, and Frederick V. Waugh (1933). “Partial Time Regressions as Compared with
Individual Trends,” Econometrica, 1, 387—401.
31
[42] Fryer, Roland G. (2011). “Racial Inequality in the 21st Century: The Declining Signicance of
Discrimination,” (pp. 855—971) in Orley C. Ashenfelter and David Card (eds.), Handbook
of Labor Economics, Vol. 4, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
[43] Heckman, James J. (1998).“Detecting Discrimination.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 12,
101—116.
[44] Heckman, James J., and Brook S. Payner (1989). “Determining the Impact of Federal An-
tidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina,”
American Economic Review, 79, 138-177.
[45] Holzer, Harry (1986). “Reservation Wages and Their Labor Market E?ects for Black and White
Male Youth,” Journal of Human Resources, 21, 157—177.
[46] Holzer, Harry (1991). “The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: What does the Evidence Show?”
Urban Studies, 28, 105—122.
[47] Hu, Luojia, and Christopher Taber (2011). “Displacement, Asymmetric Information, and Het-
erogeneous Human Capital,” Journal of Labor Economics, 29, 113—152.
[48] Jencks, Christopher, and Susan Mayer (1990.) “Residential Segregation, Job Proximity, and
Black Opportunities,” (pp. 187—222) in Laurence E. Lynn and Michael G.H. McGeary
(eds), Inner City Poverty in the United States, Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
[49] Jovanovic, Boyan (1979). “Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover,” Journal of Political
Economy, 87, 972—990.
[50] Kain, John D. (1968). “Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan Decen-
tralization,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 82, 175—19.
[51] Kletzer, Lori G. (1998). “Job Displacement,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12, 115—136.
[52] Krueger, Alan B., and Andreas Mueller (2011). “Job Search and Job Finding in a Period of
Mass Unemployment: Evidence from High-Frequency Longitudinal Data,” Working Paper
#562, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University.
[53] Lang, Kevin (1986). “A Language Theory of Discrimination,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
101, 363—382.
[54] Lang, Kevin, and Jee-Yeon K. Lehmann (2010). “Racial Discrimination in the Labor Market:
Theory and Empirics,” Unpublished Manuscript, Boston University.
[55] Lang, Kevin, and Michael Manove (2011). “Education and Labor Market Discrimination,”
American Economic Review, 101, 1467—1496.
[56] Leonard, Jonathan S. (1984a). “The Impact of A?rmative Action on Employment,” Journal
of Labor Economics, 2, 439—463.
[57] Leonard, Jonathan S. (1984b). “Employment and Occupational Advance Under A?rmative
Action,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 66, 377—385.
[58] Leonard, Jonathan S. (1990). “The Impact of A?rmative Action Regulation and Equal Em-
ployment Law on Black Employment,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4, 47-63
[59] List, John A. (2004). “The Nature and Extent of Discrimination in the Marketplace: Evidence
from the Field,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 49—89.
[60] Lundberg, Shelly J., and Richard Startz (1983). “Private Discrimination and Social Interven-
tion in Competitive Labor Market,” American Economic Review, 73, 340—347.
32
[61] McCrary, Justin (2007). “The E?ect of Court-Ordered Hiring Quotas on the Composition and
Quality of Police,” American Economic Review, 97, 318—353.
[62] Neal, Derek A. (2006). “Why Has Black-White Skill Convergence Stopped?,” (pp. 511—576) in
Eric A. Hanushek and Finis Welch (eds.), Handbook of the Economics of Education, Vol.
1, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
[63] Neal, Derek A. (2004). “The Measured Black-White Wage Gap Among Women Is Too Small,”
Journal of Political Economy, 112, S1-S28.
[64] Neal, Derek A., and William R. Johnson (1996). “The Role of Premarket Factors in Black-
White Wage Di?erences,” Journal of Political Economy, 104, 869—895.
[65] Neumark, David, Roy J. Bank, and Kyle D. Van Nort (1996). “Sex Discrimination in Restau-
rant Hiring: An Audit Study,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, 915—941.
[66] Oaxaca, Ronald L. (1973). “Male-Female Wage Di?erentials in Urban Labor Markets,” Inter-
national Economic Review, 14, 693-709.
[67] Oaxaca, Ronald L., and Michael R. Ransom (1994). “On Discrimination and the Decomposi-
tion of Wages,” Journal of Econometrics, 61, 5—21.
[68] Oettinger, Gerald S. (1996). “Statistical Discrimination and the Early Career Evolution of the
Black-White Wage Gap,” Journal of Labor Economics, 14, 52—78.
[69] O’Neill, June (1990). “The Role of Human Capital in Earnings Di?erences Between Black and
White Men,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4, 25—45.
[70] Pager, Devah (2003). “The Mark of a Criminal Record,” American Journal of Sociology, 108,
937—975.
[71] Pager, Devah (2007). “The Use of Field Experiments for Studies of Employment Discrimina-
tion: Contributions, Critiques, and Directions for the Future.” Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 609, 104-133.
[72] Pager, Devah, Bruce Western, and Bart Bonikowski (2009). “Discrimination in a Low-Wage
Labor Market: A Field Experiment,” American Sociological Review, 74, 777—799.
[73] Phelps, Edmund S. (1972). “The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 62, 659—661.
[74] Prescott, Edward C., and Robert M. Townsend (1980). “Equilibrium under Uncertainty: Mul-
tiagent Statistical Decision Theory,” (pp. 169—194) in Arnold Zellner (ed.), Bayesian Analy-
sis in Econometrics and Statistics, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
[75] Reimers, Cordelia (1983) “Labor Market Discrimination Against Hispanic and Black Men,”
Review of Economics and Statistics, 65, 570—579.
[76] Riach, Peter A., and Judith Rich (2002). “Field Experiments of Discrimination in the Market
Place,” Economic Journal, 112, F480—F518.
[77] Rodger, Willard L., Charles Brown, and Greg J. Duncan (1993). “Errors in Survey Reports of
Earnings, Hours Worked, and Hourly Wages,” Journal of the American Statistical Associ-
ation, 88, 1208—1218.
[78] Sargent, Thomas J. (1987). Dynamic Macroeconomic Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
[79] Smith, James P., and Finis R. Welch (1984). “A?rmative Action and Labor Markets,” Journal
of Labor Economics, 2, 269—301
33
[80] Smith, James P., and Finis R. Welch (1986). Closing the Gap: Forty Years of Economic
Progress for Blacks. Santa Monica: RAND.
[81] Stratton, Leslie S. (1993). “Racial Di?erences in Men’s Unemployment,” Industrial and Labor
Relations Review, 46, 451—63.
[82] Turner, Margery A., Michael Fix, and Raymond J. Struyk (1991). Opportunities Denied, Op-
portunities Diminished: Racial Discrimination in Hiring. Washington, DC: Urban Institute
Press.
[83] Western, Bruce, Meredith Kleykamp, and Jake Rosenfeld (2006). “Did Falling Wages and
Employment Increase U.S. Imprisonment,” Social Forces, 84, 2291—2311.
[84] Williams, David R. and Pamela B. Jackson (2005). “Social Sources of Racial Disparities in
Health.” Health A?airs, 24, 325—334.
[85] Wolpin, Kenneth I. (1992). “The Determinants of Black-White Di?erences in Early Employ-
ment Careers: Search, Layo?s, Quits, and Endogenous Wage Growth,” Journal of Political
Economy, 100, 535—560.
34
A Technical Appendix
In this appendix, we provide formal proofs for the results stated in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 1. Replacing ?? in (6) with ?? = ?+? ln (??)+? 0??+?? yields the estimable
specication
ln (????) = (?0 + ?0?) + ????0??0 + ? 0? (?0 + ?0?) + ?0? ln (??) + (?0?? + ????) ,
in which only (?0?? + ????) is not observed by the econometrician.
The Frisch-Waugh Theorem (Frisch and Waugh 1933) implies that
plim b???? = ?0 + Cov
³
?^????? ?0?? + ????
´
Var
³
?^????
´ ,
where ?^???? denotes the residual from projecting ????? onto ??, ln (??), and a constant. Since
Var
³
?^????
´
? 0, it su?ces to show that Cov
³
?^????? ?0?? + ????
´
? 0.
From the denition of ?^???? and using the Frisch-Waugh Theorem again one obtains:
Cov
³
?^????? ?0?? + ????
´
= Cov
Ã
????? ? ??? 0?
Cov(?????? f??)
Var(f??) ? Cov(?????? l^n (??))Var(l^n (??)) ln (??) ? ?0?? + ????
!
?
where ? ? ?[?????]??[? 0?]Cov(??????
??)
Var(??)
? Cov(??????l^n(??))
Var(l^n(??))
?[ln (??)], and f?? (l^n (??)) corresponds
to the residual from projecting ?? (ln (??)) onto ln (??) (??) and a constant. Since ???(??? ????)
as well as ln (??)?(??? ????), we have that Cov
³
?^????? ?0?? + ????
´
= Cov (?????? ?0?? + ????). As-
sumptions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 1 ensure that Cov (?????? ?0?? + ????) ? 0. Hence, plim b???? ?
?0, as desired.
Proposition 2 The sequence of reservation wages is increasing, i.e. ?? ? ??.
Proof. Note that Pr [? ? ??|? + ?] ? 0 and ? (?) ? ? with the inequality being strict for ? ? ??.
It then follows that
?? + ?
Z
?(?)?? (?|??? ?2?|?+?) ? ?? + ??.
Hence, equation (4) implies ?? ? (1? ?)? . Recognizing that ?? = (1? ?)? by (2) completes the
proof.
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Proposition 3 On average wages increase with tenure in the rm. That is, ? [?|? ? ??] ?
? [?|? ? ??? ? ? ??].
Proof. For completeness we reproduce the proof contained in Sargent (1987, pp. 79).
First, note that the mean wage of previously unemployed workers is given by
? [?|? ? ??] ? ? =
R?
?? ? ??(?|?? ?2?)R?
?? ??(?|?? ?2?)
,
and that of tenured workers equals
? [?|? ? ??? ? ? ??] ? ? =
R?
??
R?
?? ? ?? (?|?? ?2?|?+?) ??(?|?? ?2?)R?
??
R?
?? ?? (?|?? ?2?|?+?) ??(?|?? ?2?)
.
From the standard properties of normally distributed random variables it follows that
? = ? + ??
?
³
????
??
´
?
³
????
??
´ .
Moreover, since
R?
?? ?? (?|?? ?2?|?+?) = ?
³
????
??|?+?
´
, we also have that
Z ?
??
? ?? (?|?? ?2?|?+?) = ??
µ? ? ??
??|?+?
¶
+ ??
µ? ? ??
??|?+?
¶
? ??
µ? ? ??
??|?+?
¶
.
This implies
? ?
R?
?? ??
³
????
??|?+?
´
??(?|?? ?2?)R?
?? ?
³
????
??|?+?
´
??(?|?? ?2?)
? e?.
Hence, it su?ces to show that e? ? ?.
Next, let ?(?|?? ?2?) denote the probability density function associated with ?(?|?? ?2?), and
note that the density of observed wages in the second stage is given by:
e?(?|?? ?2?) =
?
?
?
?(?|???2?)??
?? ??(?|???2?)
if ? ? ??
0 if ? ? ??
.
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Similarly, dene
ee?(?|?? ?2?) =
?
???
???
?
?
????
??|?+?
?
?(?|???2?)
??
?? ?
?
????
??|?+?
?
??(?|???2?)
if ? ? ??
0 if ? ? ??
,
and let e?(?|?? ?2?) and ee?(?|?? ?2?) denote the cumulative distribution functions associated withe?(?|?? ?2?) and e?(?|?? ?2?), respectively.
By construction,
? =
Z ?
??
? ? e?(?|?? ?2?) = ?? + Z ?
??
1? e?(?|?? ?2?) ?? (8)
e? = Z ?
??
? ?ee?(?|?? ?2?) = ?? + Z ?
??
1? ee?(?|?? ?2?) ?? (9)
as well as
ee?(?|?? ?2?) = ?
³
????
??|?+?
´ R?
?? ??(?|?? ?2?)R?
?? ?
³
????
??|?+?
´
??(?|?? ?2?)
e?(?|?? ?2?).
As, for ?? ? ??, ?
³
????
??|?+?
´
is strictly increasing in ? and both ee?(?|?? ?2?) and e?(?|?? ?2?) are
probability densities, it must be the case that there exists exactly one ?0 ? ?? such that ee?(?|?? ?2?) ?e?(?|?? ?2?) whenever ? ? ?0. To see this note that R??? ??(?|?? ?2?) ? R??? ?³ ??????|?+?´ ??(?|?? ?2?)
and that 0 ? ?
³
????
??|?+?
´
? 1. Thus, e?(?|?? ?2?) ? ee?(?|?? ?2?) for su?ciently large ?. Also, recall
that e?(?00|?? ?2?) = ee?(?|?? ?2?) = 0 for ? ? ??. The fact that ?³ ??????|?+?´ is strictly increasing implies
that
??(?|???2?)
?(?|???2?) is strictly increasing as well (for ? ? ?
?). Since both densities have to integrate up
to one, we have that e?(??|?? ?2?) ? ee?(??|?? ?2?) and that the density functions cross only once.
Therefore,
ee?(?|?? ?2?) ? e?(?|?? ?2?) for ? ? ?0. From (8) and (9) it then follows that e? ? ?,
which completes the proof.
Proposition 4 Lower arrival rates result in lower reservation wages, i.e. ??
?
?? ? 0.
Proof. By (2) it su?ces to show that ???? ? 0. Rearranging (5) and taking the derivative with
respect to ? gives
??
?? =
? (1? ?)
(1? ? (1? ?))2
Z
? (?) ??
¡
?|?? ?2?
¢
+
??
1? ? (1? ?)
?
??
Z
? (?) ??
¡
?|?? ?2?
¢
. (10)
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From the denition of ? (?) it follows that, for all ?,
?? (?)
?? ? min{?
?
??
Z
? (?) ??
³
?|?? ?2?|?+?
´
? ???? }; (11)
and from equation (1) we have that
?? (?)
?? ? min{
??
1? ? (1? ?)
??
?? ?
??
?? }
for all ?.
Case 1: Suppose ???? ? 0. Then, as 0 ?
??
1??(1??) ? 1,
??(?)
?? ?
??
?? . Thus, by (11) we have that
?? (?)
?? ?
??
?? .
Since the distribution of ? is nondegenerate normal and agents can always refuse negative o?ers,
? (?) ? 0 for all ?. Therefore,
??
?? ?
??
1? ? (1? ?)
?
??
Z
? (?) ??
¡
?|?? ?2?
¢
? ??
1? ? (1? ?)
??
?? . (12)
Letting ? ? ??1??(1??) and rearranging (12) gives
(1? ?) ???? ? 0,
which produces a contradiction, as 0 ? ? ? 1.
Case 2: Suppose ???? ? 0. Then,
??(?)
?? ?
??
1??(1??)
??
?? and
?? (?)
?? ?
??2
1??(1??)
??
?? . In this case,
equation (12) becomes
??
?? ?
??
1? ? (1? ?)
??2
1? ? (1? ?)
??
?? .
Again, letting ? ? ??1??(1??)
??2
1??(1??) and rearranging gives
(1? ?) ???? ? 0. (13)
Note that 0 ? ? ? 1. Hence, (13) demonstrates that ???? ? 0, as desired.
Proposition 5 A higher probability of job loss results in lower reservation wages, i.e. ??
?
?? ? 0.
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Proof. By (2) it su?ces to show that ???? ? 0. Rearranging (5) and taking the derivative with
respect to ? gives
??
?? =
??
1? ? (1? ?)
?
??
Z
? (?) ??
¡
?|?? ?2?
¢
. (14)
From the (3) we have that, for all ?,
?? (?)
?? ? max{?
?
??
Z
? (?) ??
³
?|?? ?2?|?+?
´
? ???? }; (15)
and from the denition of ? , i.e. ? (?) = max {? + ??? + (1? ?)?? (?) ? ?}, it follows that either
?? (?)
?? =
?
1? ? (1? ?) (?? ? (?)) +
??
1? ? (1? ?)
??
?? (16)
or
?? (?)
?? =
??
?? .
Since ? (?) ? ? for all ?, it must be the case that ??(?)?? ? max{
??
1??(1??)
??
?? ?
??
?? }.
Case 1: Suppose ???? ? 0. Then, as 0 ?
??
1??(1??) ? 1,
??(?)
?? ?
??
?? . Thus, by (15) we have that
?? (?)
?? ?
??
?? .
This and (14) imply
??
?? ?
??
1? ? (1? ?)
??
?? . (17)
Letting ? ? ??1??(1??) and rearranging (17) gives
(1? ?) ???? ? 0,
which produces a contradiction, since 0 ? ? ? 1.
Case 2: Suppose ???? ? 0. Then, as 0 ?
??
1??(1??) ? 1,
??(?)
?? ?
??
1??(1??)
??
?? . Thus, by (15) we have
that ?? (?)?? ?
??2
1??(1??)
??
?? .
In this case equation (17) becomes
??
?? ?
??
1? ? (1? ?)
??2
1? ? (1? ?)
??
?? .
Letting ? ? ??1??(1??)
??2
1??(1??) and rearranging gives
(1? ?) ???? ? 0. (18)
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Note that 0 ? ? ? 1. Hence, (18) demonstrates that ???? ? 0.
It remains to be shown that ???? 6= 0. By way of contradiction, suppose
??
?? = 0. Then,
??(?)
?? ? 0
with the inequality being strict for large enough ? (due to (16) and the fact that ? (?) ? ? for large
?). From (3) we have that ?? (?)?? ? 0, again with the inequality being strict for ? large enough.
This in connection with (14) implies that ???? ? 0, which produces the desired contradiction.
B Data Appendix
B.1 NJ UI Data
The following description of the NJ UI data borrows heavily from Krueger and Mueller (2011).
For a more detailed description of the data (in particular of the sampling procedures, the survey
instrument, or details of the implementation) the interested reader should consult their appendix.
During the fall of 2009 and early 2010 the Princeton University Survey Research Center (PSRC)
collected high-frequency longitudinal information on the unemployed in the state of New Jer-
sey. Starting from a complete list of the approximately 360,000 individuals receiving unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) as of September 28, 2009, PSRC drew a stratied random sample of 63,813
individuals–oversampling the long-term unemployed. The sampled population was then contacted
by the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development (LWD) and invited (by email
or letter) to participate in a condential web survey for a period of 12 consecutive weeks. Individu-
als who were unemployed for 60 weeks or longer at the beginning of the survey were later asked to
participate in an additional 12 weeks of interviewing–for a maximum of 24 weeks. In this paper,
however, we restrict attention to the rst 12 weeks for all respondents.
Six to ten days after the initial invitation, PSCR made almost 10,000 phone calls encouraging
non-responders to participate in the survey. Two weeks thereafter the survey was closed for new
participants. In order to remind respondents to participate in the weekly follow-up surveys e-mail
invitations were sent out seven days after completion of the most recent online interview, but not
on Sundays or Mondays.41
As incentive to participate respondents could choose between a $20 Visa gift card mailed to
them within a few days, or a $40 one sent out after the 12 week survey period–regardless of
whether the respondent would complete any follow-up interviews.
41This restriction was imposed so the time diary would pertain to a weekday. Respondents who completed their
most recent survey on a Sunday would receive their invitation on Tuesday of the following week.
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The actual survey consisted of an initial entry questionnaire and weekly follow-up interviews.
The former elicited information on demographics, previous employment, asset holdings, and spouses’
employment status; whereas the latter inquired about job search activities, time use, reservation
wages, and job o?ers, among other topics. Participants were given the choice of receiving an incen-
tive payment of $20 within a few days of completing the entry questionnaire, or $40 at the end of
the 12 week survey period.
Unfortunately, only 6,025 of the sampled individuals participated in the entry wave of the survey,
and those who responded to the initial interview completed only about 40 percent of weekly follow-
ups. Moreover, participants were more educated, more likely to be female, and had higher previ-
ous earnings than the baseline population. Using rich administrative data, Krueger and Mueller
(2011) create sampling weights in order to adjust for the stratied survey design as well as nonre-
sponse. Comparing characteristics of respondents to the universe of UI recipients along a number
of dimensions, they conclude that the low response rate did not signicantly skew the sample on
observables–even on those that were not used in calculating the weights. Throughout our analysis
we use the weights created by Krueger and Mueller (2011). Moreover, we restrict attention to
respondents with non-missing information on race who are not listed as previously self-employed.
Our nal sample consists of 5,251 individuals and 26,901 person-week observations.
The following variables are used throughout our analysis:
Race is a set of mutually exclusive indicator variables, i.e. White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and
Other Race, that denote a respondent’s racial identication. In our regressions White serves as the
omitted category.
Female is an indicator variable that equals one if the respondent is female and zero otherwise.
Age denotes the respondent’s age in years.
Number of Children denotes the respondent’s number of children. The variable is taken from
the entry questionnaire which asked “How many children do you have?”
Marital Status is a set of mutually exclusive indicator variables, i.e. Single, Married, Divorced,
Widowed, and Cohabitating But Not Married, that denote a respondent’s marital status. The
information is taken from the entry questionnaire which asked “What is your marital status?” The
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set of possible answers was: “Single (Never Married)”, “Married”, “Divorced”, “Widowed”, and
“Domestic partnership (living together but not married)”.
Educational Attainment is a set of mutually exclusive indicator variables, i.e. High School
Dropout, High School Graduate, Some College, and College Graduate, that denote a respondent’s
highest level of completed education. The information is taken from the entry questionnaire which
asked “What is the highest level of education you have completed?” The set of possible answers
was: “Some high school or less”, “High school diploma or equivalent”, “Some college”, “College
diploma”, “Some graduate school”, “Graduate degree”. For the purposes of this paper we combine
the last three answer choices into one category.
Weeks Unemployed denotes the duration of a respondent’s unemployment spell as of the time
she lled out a weekly follow-up survey. The variable has been constructed using information on
the time she lost her main job, i.e. the one at which she worked the most hours, from the entry
questionnaire as well as on the time she lled out the weekly survey.
Previous Weekly Earnings denotes the respondent’s average weekly earnings during the past
year. This variable has been constructed using administrative information form the New Jersey
Department of Labor and Workforce Development on earnings and weeks worked in the base year.
Following Krueger and Mueller (2011) we discard observation with weekly earnings of less than
$100 or more than $8,000, and impute base year earnings of $152,191 for those individuals subject
to top-coding.
Tenure on Previous Job denotes the time (in years) that the respondent worked for her previous
employer. The variable is taken from the entry questionnaire which asked “How many years had
you worked for that employer when that job ended?”
Reason Last Job Ended is a set of mutually exclusive indicator variables, i.e. Quit Last Job,
Laid O? from Last Job, and Last Job was Temporary, which denote why the respondent’s last job
ended. The information is taken from the entry questionnaire which asked “Did you lose or quit
that job, or was it a temporary job that ended?” The set of possible answers was: “Lost job”,
“Quit Job”, and “Temporary Job ended”. In our regressions Laid O? from Last Job serves as the
omitted category.
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Previous Industry refers to a set of nine indicator variables categorizing the industry in which
participants previously worked according to the North American Industry Classication System
(NAICS).
Received O?er Last Week is an indicator variable for whether the respondent reports having
received at least one job o?er during the previous seven days. The variable is taken from the
weekly follow-up surveys which asked “In the last 7 days, did you receive any job o?ers? If yes,
how many?”
O?ered Hourly Wage denotes the pay associated with the best job o?er the respondent re-
ceived within the last seven days, converted into an hourly rate. To construct this variable we use
information from the weekly follow-up surveys which asked “What was the wage or salary o?ered
(before deductions)? Is that per year, per month, bi-weekly, weekly or per hour?” and “How many
hours a week would you have to work on that job?”. We discard observations with missing informa-
tion on hours, and, following Krueger and Mueller (2011), observations with hourly o?ered wages
of less than $5 or more than $100.
Accepted Job O?er in Hand is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent accepted
or thinks she will accept the best o?er received within the last seven days. The variable is taken
from the weekly follow-up surveys which asked “Have you accepted or do you think you will accept
this job o?er?” The set of possible answers was: “Yes”, “No”, “Don’t know yet”. Only respondents
answering “Yes” are coded as one; those who say “Don’t know yet” are set to missing.
Accepted Hourly Wage denotes the hourly wage associated with job o?ered that the respon-
dent accepted, if she in fact did accept one. The variable is coded in the same way as the two
previous ones.
Looking for Job Last Week is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent was actively
looking for work during the previous seven days. The variable is taken from the weekly follow-up
surveys which asked “Have you done anything to nd work during the last 7 days?”.
Hours Spent Searching denotes the total number of hours the respondent claims to have spent
trying to nd a job. The variable is constructed using information from the weekly follow-up sur-
veys which asked “On the previous page you indicated what kind of methods you used to nd work.
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In the last 7 days, about how many hours and minutes did you spend on each of those methods?
Your best guess is okay.” The set of methods included: “Contacted employer directly”, “Contacted
public employment agency”, “Contacted private employment agency”, “Contacted friends or rela-
tives”, “Contacted school/university employment center”, “Checked union/professional registers”,
“Attended job training programs/courses”, “Placed or answered ads”, “Went to interview”, “Sent
out resumes/lled out applications,” “Looked at ads,” “Other”.
Number of Applications denotes the number of jobs to which the respondent applied within
the last seven days. The variable is taken from the weekly follow-up surveys which asked “How
many jobs did you apply to in the last 7 days?”
Didn’t Apply to Some Job Ad Last Week is an indicator variable equal to one if the
respondent did not apply to any job for which she was qualied–for any reason. The variable is
constructed using information from the weekly follow-up surveys which asked “What about jobs
you did not apply for? Did you nd or hear about any jobs in the last 7 days for which you are
qualied but did not apply for?”
Didn’t Apply Since Too Far Away is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent did
not apply to any job for which she was qualied because it was too far away, and equal to zero
if she did not apply for any other reason. The variable is constructed using information from the
weekly follow-up surveys which asked “What about jobs you did not apply for? Did you nd or
hear about any jobs in the last 7 days for which you are qualied but did not apply for?” and “Why
not? Please check all that apply.”
Applied to Any White Collar Job Last Week is an indicator variable equal to one if the
respondent applied to a white collar job within the last seven days and zero otherwise. The variable
has been constructed using information from the weekly follow-up surveys which asked “Please list
the three most recent jobs you applied to in the last 7 days. If you applied to more than one of the
same kind of job, list each job separately. (examples of job titles include: waiter, computer techni-
cian, warehouse worker, administrative assistant, etc.)” The answers in the text entry elds were
then categorized into Standard Occupational Categories (SOC) by trained sta? at the University of
Wisconsin Survey Center. 97% of job titles could be successfully matched to 3-digit SOC codes. We
code the following 2000 Major Groups as ‘white collar’: “Management”, “Business and Financial
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Operations”, “Computer and Mathematical Occupations”, “O?ce and Administrative Support”,
“Architecture and Engineering”, “Life, Physical, and Social Science”, “Community and Social
Services”, “Legal Occupations”, “Education, Training, and Library Occupations”, “Arts, Design,
Entertainment, Sports, and Media”, “Healthcare Practitioners and Technical Occupations”.
Applied to Any Blue Collar Job Last Week is an indicator variable equal to one if the
respondent applied to a blue collar job within the last seven days and zero otherwise. The variable
has been constructed using information from the weekly follow-up surveys which asked “Please list
the three most recent jobs you applied to in the last 7 days. If you applied to more than one of
the same kind of job, list each job separately. (examples of job titles include: waiter, computer
technician, warehouse worker, administrative assistant, etc.)” The answers in the text entry elds
were then categorized into Standard Occupational Categories (SOC) by trained sta? at the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Survey Center. 97% of job titles could be successfully matched to 3-digit SOC
codes. We code the following 2000 Major Groups as ‘blue collar’: “Building and Grounds Cleaning
and Maintenance”, “Farming, Fishing, and Forestry”, “Construction and Extraction Occupations”,
“Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Occupations”, “Production”, “Transportation and Material
Moving”.
Applied to Any Service Job Last Week is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent
applied to a service job within the last seven days and zero otherwise. The variable has been
constructed using information from the weekly follow-up surveys which asked “Please list the three
most recent jobs you applied to in the last 7 days. If you applied to more than one of the same
kind of job, list each job separately. (examples of job titles include: waiter, computer technician,
warehouse worker, administrative assistant, etc.)” The answers in the text entry elds were then
categorized into Standard Occupational Categories (SOC) by trained sta? at the University of
Wisconsin Survey Center. 97% of job titles could be successfully matched to 3-digit SOC codes.
We code the following 2000 Major Groups as ‘service jobs’: “Healthcare Support Occupations”,
“Protective Service Occupations”, “Food Preparation and Serving Related Occupations”, “Personal
Care and Service Occupations”, “Sales and Related Occupations”.
Reservation Wage denotes the lowest hourly wage such that the respondent would accept a
job o?er. The variable is taken from the weekly follow-up surveys which asked “Suppose someone
o?ered you a job today. What is the lowest wage or salary you would accept (before deductions)
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for the type of work you are looking for?” In converting answers referring to yearly, monthly, or
weekly time frames into hourly wages we assume 50 work weeks per year and a 40 hour work week.
Bargained over O?er in Hand is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent bargained
with an employer over a job o?er she had received. The variable is taken from the weekly follow-up
surveys which asked “When you were o?ered this job, did the employer make a ‘take-it-or leave-it’
o?er or was there some bargaining that took place over the pay?” The set of possible answers was:
“‘Take-it-or leave-it’ o?er”, and “Some bargaining over pay”.
Chose $20 Now over $40 in 12 Weeks is an indicator equal to one of the respondent chose
to receive a $20 Visa gift card now, and zero if she opted for a $40 one to be received in 12 weeks.
The exact phrasing of the question was “Thank you for taking the time to complete this week’s
survey! [...] To express our thanks, we would like to mail you a Visa gift card. You can choose
between the following two options: ?A $20 Visa gift card that will be mailed to you today. ?A $40
Visa gift card that will be mailed to you in 12 weeks from today. If you choose the second option,
we will send you the Visa gift card even if you don’t return to this survey during the next 12 weeks.
Please click here if you would like more information about the Visa gift card.”
Zip Code Level Controls denotes a set of zip code specic variables that have been matched
with an observation based on a respondent’s residence. The additional data has been obtained from
the commercial product Geolytics Estimates premium 2010, which contains current year estimates
of demographic and other variables down to the county, or zip code level. In particular, our
controls labeled ‘Demographic Composition’ include: population density, median age, the share of
residents that is white, black, Hispanic, Asian, or of any other race, and median household income.
Those labeled ‘Composition of Workforce’ include: the share of the workforce in construction,
manufacturing, retail, or nance. And ‘Unemployment Rate’ refers to the estimated unemployment
rate within a zip code.
County denotes the FIPS code of a respondent’s county of residence.
B.2 Displaced Workers Survey (DWS)
Sponsored by the Employment and Training Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor, the
Displaced Workers Survey (DWS) is a national survey gathering information on the severity of job
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displacements and to assess employment stability. Since 1994 the DWS has been conducted as a
biannual supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS)–a monthly nationally representative
labor force survey which interviews roughly 56,000 households across the US.42 In 2008 and 2010
the DWS was administered together with the January CPS. Our raw data for the DWS (and the
January CPS) have been obtained from the National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER)
website.43
To be eligible for the DWS a worker had to be part of the CPS universe, at least 20 years of
age, and lost or left a job during the previous three years because her plant or company closed
or moved, there was insu?cient work for her to do, or their position or shift was abolished. In
our analysis we restrict attention to individuals of prime working age, i.e. those who are between
20 and 55 years old, who are (at the time of the survey) neither enrolled in school nor enlisted
in the military, and who are neither missing information on their current weekly earnings nor on
race. Imposing these restrictions and pooling across the 2008 and 2010 waves leaves us with 5,098
observations. To account for unequal sampling probabilities we use the DWS probability weights
provided with the data.
The following describes the variables in our analysis:
Race is a set of mutually exclusive indicator variables, i.e. White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and
Other Race, that denote a respondent’s racial identication. In our regressions White serves as the
omitted category.
Female is an indicator variable that equals one if the respondent is female and zero otherwise.
Age denotes the respondent’s age in years.
Urban is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent lives in a Metropolitan Statistical
Area, and zero otherwise.
Educational Attainment is a set of mutually exclusive indicator variables, i.e. High School
Dropout, High School Graduate, Some College, and College Graduate, that denote a respondent’s
highest level of completed education. In our coding of this variable we combine several categories
in the nely distinguished raw data, to arrive at this classication.
42For more information on the CPS and its sampling design see ?http://www.bls.gov/cps/?.
43Currently, the data are available at ?http://www.nber.org/data/cps_basic.html?.
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Weekly Earnings denotes a respondent’s weekly earnings on her current (main) job. The in-
formation for this variable stems from the main part of the CPS as well as the Displaced Workers
supplement. We use the edited variables that are released with the data giving preference to the
information contained in the main part of the CPS. We discard observations with reported weekly
earnings below $100 or above $8,000.
Previous Earnings denotes a respondent’s weekly earnings on the job from which she was
displaced. The information for this variable stems directly from Displaced Workers Survey. We use
the edited variable that is released with the data and discard observations with reported weekly
earnings below $100 or above $8,000.
Year denotes the year in which the survey was administered, i.e. 2008 or 2010.
State is the FIPS code for a respondent’s state of residence.
Previous Industry corresponds to the “detailed industry recode” with respect to a respondent’s
job from she was displaced. The variable is released as part of the DWS.
B.3 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NSLY79)
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NSLY79) is a nationally representative sample
of 12,686 young men and women who were between 14 and 22 years old when they were rst in-
terviewed in 1979. These individuals have been surveyed annually through 1994 and biannually
thereafter. Covered topics include: family background and demographic characteristics, household
composition, marital and fertility histories, labor market experiences, training investments, school-
ing and aptitude information, military experience, income and assets, health conditions, injuries,
and insurance coverage, alcohol and substance use, criminal behavior, attitudes and aspirations,
and more.
The NLSY79 consists of three subsamples: (i) A cross-sectional sample of 6,111 individuals
designed to be representative of the noninstitutionalized US population ages 14—21 as of December
31, 1978; (ii) a supplemental sample of 5,295 individuals oversampling civilian Hispanics, blacks,
and economically disadvantaged non-Hispanic whites living in the US and between the ages of 14—21
as of December 31, 1978; (iii) a military sample of 1,280 individuals designed to be representative
of the population between the ages of 17—21 as of December 31, 1978 and enlisted in the active
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branches of the military as of September 30, 1978. Our data has been obtained from the NLSY
website.44 For additional information on the NLSY79 see the NLS Handbook.45
B.3.1 Analysis in Table 3B
In Table 3B we rely on data from the 2000 through 2006 waves of the NLSY. We restricted attention
to individuals in the civil labor force who change employers between two successive interview rounds
and who are not missing information on current hourly wages at their CPS job–for a nal sample
of 6,047 observations from 4,143 distinct individuals. To account for unequal sampling probabilities
we weight each observation by its cross-sectional year specic sampling weight provided with the
data.
The following variables are used:
Race is a set of mutually exclusive indicator variables, i.e. White, Black, and Hispanic, that
denote a respondent’s racial identication. In our regressions White serves as the omitted category.
Female is an indicator variable that equals one if the respondent is female and zero otherwise.
Age denotes the respondent’s age in years.
Urban is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent’s current residence is urban, and
equal to zero if it is rural.
Years of Schooling denotes the respondent’s highest grade or year of regular school that she
has completed and gotten credit for. The variable is top-coded at 20 years of schooling, i.e. eight
years or more of tertiary education.
AFQT denotes an individual’s standardized score on the Armed Forces Qualication Test. We
standardize test scores (to have mean zero and a standard deviation of one) by age at the time the
test was taken.
44Currently, the NLSY website is located at ?http://www.nlsinfo.org?.
45The NLS Handbook 2005 is available online at ?http://www.bls.gov/nls/handbook/nlshndbk.htm?.
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Current Hourly Wage gives a respondent’s hourly wage at the main job she holds at the time
of the survey, i.e. the CPS job. The variable is taken from the work history le. We discard
observations with reported hourly wages below $5 and above $100.
Previous Wage denotes the a respondent’s hourly wage at the main job she held at the time of
the previous survey. The variable is taken from the work history le. We discard observations with
reported hourly wages below $5 and above $100.
Year denotes the year in which the survey was administered, i.e. 2000, 2004, or 2006.
Previous Industry is a set of twelve indicator variables (based on 3-digit 1970 Census classi-
cations) denoting the industry of a respondent’s previous employer, i.e. the employer at the time
of the last survey.
B.3.2 Analysis in Table 11
Our analysis in Table 11 closely follows the coding and sample construction procedures in Altonji
and Pierret (2001) in order to replicate their results as closely as possible–before extending them.
In what follows we lean heavily on the description in Altonji and Pierret (2001, pp. 345). For a
more detailed account the interested reader should consult their data appendix directly.
The sample is limited to black and non-Hispanics white males, who left school before 1992;
and only jobs after a person has left school are being considered. The time a person leaves school
is dened as the “month and year of the most recent enrollment at the rst interview where the
respondent is not currently enrolled in school” (p. 345). We use Altonji and Pierret’s (2001) exact
coding of this variable. Further sample restrictions include: at least eight years of education, at
least one valid observation on wages, no missing data on AFQT score, no missing information on
rst occupation, and no missing information other variables.46 Altonji and Pierret’s (2001) nal
sample contains 2,976 individuals. To rule out that sample selection drives our results, we use this
exact set of individuals in our analysis.
Employment is only considered for the current (or most recent) CPS employer, and only if the
respondent is working at the job in the week of the interview. In case of two concurrent jobs, only
the job at which the respondent works the most hours is considered–regardless of whether it is
46Altonji and Pierret (2001) also drop 805 respondents who left school before 1978 for whom they could not
reconstruct their work history.
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full- or part-time. Military jobs, however, are excluded. All valid observations are included, even
if individuals did not participate in particular waves of the NLSY. Moreover, Altonji and Pierret
(2001) use all subsamples of the NLSY, and focus waves 1979-92. So do we. Our replication sample
consists of 21,026 observations–compared to 21,058 in their Table 1.47 In columns (7) and (8) of
Table 11 we add data for the 1993—2006 waves of the NLSY, using the sample restrictions outlined
above. This extends the sample to 33,931 observations.
The following describes the coding of the variables used throughout the analysis:
Race is a set of mutually exclusive indicator variables, i.e. White, and Black, that denote a
respondent’s racial identication. In our regressions White serves as the omitted category.
Years of Schooling denotes the respondent’s highest grade or year of regular school that she
has completed and gotten credit for. The variable is top-coded at 20 years of schooling, i.e. eight
years or more of tertiary education.
AFQT denotes an individual’s standardized score on the Armed Forces Qualication Test. We
standardize test scores (to have mean zero and a standard deviation of one) by age at the time the
test were taken.
Potential Experience is coded as a respondent’s current age minus her years of schooling minus
six.
Hourly Wage denotes a respondent’s real hourly wage at her CPS job. The raw variable is taken
from the work history le. To convert nominal into real wages we use the Personal Consumption
Expenditures: Chain-type Price Index (PCECTPI) constructed by the U.S. Department of Com-
merce: Bureau of Economic Analysis, and set 1987 as the base year. Following Altonji and Pierret
(2001) we discard wage observations with real hourly wages below $2 and in excess of $100.
Tenure denotes a respondent’s total tenure (in years) with the employer at her CPS job.
Urban Residence is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent’s residence at the time
of the survey is urban, and equal to zero if it is rural.
47For 32 observations included in the sample of Altonji and Pierret (2001) the work histroy le of the NLSY79 did
not contain a valid wage. We suspect this may be due to later revisions and consistency checks applied to the raw
data.
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Occupation at First Job denotes the two-digit occupation at the respondent’s rst job after
leaving school. We obtain this variable directly from Altonji and Pierret (2001).
Year denotes the year in which the survey was administered. The NSLY79 surveyed participants
on a yearly basis from 1979—94 and every other year thereafter.
C Additional Results
See Tables C.1—C.7.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Wage Offers, by Race
Notes: Figure displays kernel density estimates of the distribution of wage offers in the raw NJ UI data, 
separately by race. 'Whites' refers to non-Hispanic whites, 'Blacks' to non-Hispanic blacks, and 'Other Races' is 
the residual category.
Figure 1: Bellman's Functional Equation
!
J(! )
Q
! *
! +"#Q
1!#(1!")
Blacks
Whites
Other Races
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
0 20 40 60 80 100
Dollars per Hour
Variable Full Sample White Black Other Races
Demographics:
Female .471 .445 .579 .439
(.499) (.497) (.494) (.597)
Age 41.6 44.7 37.6 38.2
(13.5) (13.6) (12.3) (12.6)
Educational Attainment:
High School Dropout .072 .039 .109 .112
(.258) (.193) (.311) (.316)
High School Graduate .301 .293 .360 .269
 (.459) (.455) (.480) (.443)
Some College .352 .349 .362 .349
(.478) (.477) (.481) (.477)
College Graduate .275 .319 .169 .270
(.447) (.466) (.375) (.444)
Weeks Unemployed at Beginning of Survey 42.9 42.2 46.6 41.4
(30.9) (30.2) (34.2) (29.4)
Previous Job:
Weekly Earnings 857 992 603 779
(688) (767) (438) (604)
Years of Tenure 4.69 5.32 3.47 4.35
(6.46) (6.84) (5.49) (6.19)
Last Job was Temporary .157 .140 .190 .164
(.364) (.347) (.393) (.370)
Quit Last Job .045 .039 .062 .044
(.208) (.194) (.241) (.204)
Laid Off from Last Job .798 .820 .747 .793
(.401) (.384) (.435) (.406)
Previous Industry:
Mining, Utilities, and Construction .066 .086 .024 .059
(.249) (.280) (.153) (.235)
Manufacturing .099 .090 .049 .165
(.299) (.286) (.215) (.372)
Wholesale and Retail Trade .243 .247 .242 .236
(.429) (.431) (.429) (.425)
Professional, Scientific and Technical Services .329 .326 .376 .295
(.470) (.469) (.485) (.456)
Educational and Health Care Services .119 .097 .162 .131
(.323) (.296) (.369) (.337)
Arts, Recreation and Food Services .062 .063 .064 .058
(.241) (.243) (.245) (.233)
Other Services .018 .019 .019 .013
(.132) (.138) (.135) (.112)
Public Administration .063 .071 .064 .045
(.243) (.257) (.246) (.207)
Job Offers:
Received Offer Last Week .065 .053 .075 .082
(.247) (.223) (.263) (.274)
Offered Hourly Wage 18.5 23.4 12.3 16.9
(13.6) (16.0) (4.8) (12.2)
Accepted Job Offer in Hand .788 .791 .860 .741
(.409) (.407) (.348) (.439)
Accepted Hourly Wage 20.0 25.3 12.3 18.7
(15.2) (16.9) (6.0) (14.9)
Search Intensity:
Looking for Job Last Week .818 .821 .832 .802
(.386) (.383) (.374) (.399)
Hours Spent Searching (per Week) 10.5 10.9 11.0 9.3
(14.3) (14.0) (15.9) (13.8)
Number of Applications Sent Out 4.88 4.75 6.03 4.43
(7.76) (7.99) (8.29) (6.87)
Search Strategies:
Didn't Apply to Some Job Ad Last Week .078 .084 .092 .059
(.268) (.277) (.290) (.235)
Didn't Apply Since Too Far Away .295 .353 .314 .163
(.456) (.478) (.465) (.370)
Farthest Distance Traveled to Look for Work (miles) 16.22 14.82 15.93 18.97
(22.84) (22.49) (19.75) (24.99)
Applied to Any White Collar Job Last Week .804 .838 .801 .746
(.397) (.369) (.399) (.435)
Applied to Any Blue Collar Job Last Week .089 .065 .052 .154
(.285) (.247) (.222) (.361)
Applied to Any Service Job Last Week .054 .051 .061 .055
(.227) (.220) (.240) (.228)
Reservation Wage 20.0 22.1 15.8 19.1
(11.5) (12.4) (8.0) (11.0)
Bargaining and Discounting:
Bargained over Offer in Hand .245 .297 .149 .241
(.430) (.457) (.357) (.429)
Chose $20 Now over $40 in 12 Weeks .540 .459 .712 .571
(.498) (.498) (.453) (.495)
Number of Individuals 5,251 3,566 839 846
Table 1: Summary Statistics, NJ UI Data
Notes: Notes: Entries are weighted means and standard deviations for those individuals with non-missing information. See 
the Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black -.404 -.286 -.169 -.165 -.160
(.059) (.061) (.056) (.057) (.060)
Other Races -.243 -.233 -.170 -.173 -.201
(.085) (.072) (.063) (.065) (.063)
Female -.162 -.248 -.101 -.096 -.114
(.064) (.062) (.051) (.050) (.048)
Age .041 .042 .003 .007 .002
(.016) (.016) (.015) (.015) (.014)
Age Squared (÷100) -.040 -.042 -.000 -.004 .001
(.020) (.020) (.019) (.018) (.017)
High School Graduate -.074 -.124 -.142 -.086
(.120) (.102) (.108) (.099)
Some College .251 .060 .041 .084
(.122) (.102) (.107) (.094)
College Graduate .451 .164 .150 .206
(.129) (.101) (.106) (.098)
Log Previous Weekly Earnings .416 .408 .417
(.052) (.051) (.051)
Weeks Unemployed -.005 -.006
(.003) (.003)
Weeks Unemployed Squared (÷100) .003 .003
(.002) (.002)
Quit Last Job .019 -.006
(.112) (.105)
Last Job was Temporary .054 .044
(.068) (.069)
Constant 2.068 1.840 -.005 .093 .146
(.321) (.342) (.368) (.384) (.390)
Previous Industry Fixed Effects No No No No Yes
R-Squared .192 .320 .479 .489 .512
Number of Observations 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194
Table 2: Racial Differences in Wage Offers, NJ UI Data
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating  the empirical model by 
weighted least squares. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by individual 
and reported in parentheses. In addition to the variables shown in the table, indicator variables 
for missing values on each covariate are also included in the regressions. See the Data 
Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Log Offered Hourly Wage
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Black -.278 -.224 -.157 -.170
(.040) (.038) (.035) (.035)
Other Races -.252 -.137 -.060 -.063
(.028) (.029) (.026) (.026)
Female -.253 -.293 -.182 -.193
(.022) (.021) (.019) (.021)
Age .106 .086 .058 .058
(.009) (.008) (.008) (.008)
Age Squared (÷100) -.123 -.098 -.069 -.068
(.011) (.011) (.010) (.010)
Urban .167 .106 .073 .088
(.029) (.029) (.028) (.028)
High School Graduate .172 .111 .106
(.034) (.031) (.031)
Some College .268 .180 .165
(.036) (.033) (.034)
College Graduate .627 .399 .366
(.037) (.036) (.036)
Log Previous Weekly Earnings .515 .493
(.020) (.021)
Constant 4.250 4.352 1.739 1.909
(.151) (.149) (.169) (.184)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Previous Industry Fixed Effects No No No Yes
R-Squared .151 .235 .374 .390
Number of Observations 5,098 5,098 5,098 5,098
Table 3A: Racial Differences in Current Wages, Displaced Workers Survey 2008 & 2010
Log Current Hourly Wage
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating  the empirical model 
by weighted least squares. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. In addition to the variables shown in the table, indicator variables for 
missing values on each covariate are also included in the regressions. See the Data 
Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black -.306 -.225 -.129 -.081 -.084
(.020) (.018) (.020) (.016) (.016)
Hispanic -.104 .013 .068 .053 .049
(.025) (.023) (.023) (.018) (.017)
Female -.267 -.297 -.287 -.178 -.139
(.020) (.018) (.018) (.015) (.016)
Age -.099 -.048 -.042 -.032 -.011
(.061) (.056) (.055) (.048) (.047)
Age Squared (÷100) .122 .058 .051 .035 .011
(.075) (.068) (.067) (.059) (.057)
Urban .183 .096 .089 .061 .060
(.022) (.019) (.019) (.016) (.016)
Years of Schooling .094 .072 .049 .052
(.004) (.004) (.003) (.003)
AFQT .109 .060 .055
(.013) (.010) (.010)
AFQT Squared -.012 -.022 -.022
(.011) (.009) (.009)
Log Previous Wage .486 .404
(.147) (.145)
Log Previous Wage Squared .006 .016
(.028) (.028)
Constant 4.662 2.427 2.616 1.469 1.102
(1.259) (1.148) (1.141) (1.016) (.988)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Previous Industry Fixed Effects No No No No Yes
R-Squared .101 .280 .299 .438 .470
Number of Observations 6,074 6,074 6,074 6,074 6,074
Table 3B: Racial Differences in Current Wages, NLSY79 2000–2006
Log Current Hourly Wage
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating  the empirical model by 
weighted least squares. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by individual and 
reported in parentheses. The sample consists of black, Hispanic, and  non-Hispanic white 
individuals in the civil labor force who change employers between two successive interview 
rounds. Hence Previous Wage refers to the wage associated with the job held at the time of the last 
interview. In addition to the variables shown in the table, indicator variables for missing values on 
each covariate are also included in the regressions. See the Data Appendix for a precise 
description of the sample construction procedures.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Black -.404 -.160 -.179 -.152
(.059) (.060) (.057) (.065)
Other Races -.243 -.200 -.207 -.224
(.085) (.063) (.060) (.069)
Female -.162 -.114 -.103 -.106
(.064) (.048) (.047) (.047)
Age .041 .002 .005 .005
(.016) (.014) (.013) (.011)
Age Squared  (÷100) -.040 -.001 -.003 -.002
(.020) (.017) (.016) (.013)
High School Graduate -.086 -.072 -.077
(.099) (.085) (.099)
Some College .084 .114 .172
(.094) (.081) (.090)
College Graduate .206 .204 .238
(.098) (.083) (.091)
Log Previous Weekly Earnings .417 .397 .413
(.051) (.047) (.045)
Weeks Unemployed -.006 -.006 -.007
(.003) (.002) (.002)
Weeks Unemployed Squared (÷100) .003 .004 .004
(.002) (.001) (.001)
Quit Last Job -.006 -.049 .002
(.105) (.104) (.097)
Last Job was Temporary .044 .036 .069
(.069) (.071) (.065)
Distance Traveled Looking for Work:
1 to 5 miles -.230 -.244
(.071) (.073)
6 to 10 miles -.133 -.172
(.070) (.073)
11 to 25 miles -.223 -.219
(.055) (.055)
26 to 50 miles -.217 -.203
(.062) (.060)
51 to 100 miles .093 .128
(.144) (.138)
more than 100 miles .003 -.033
(.189) (.158)
Constant 2.068 .146 .374 .275
(.321) (.390) (.372) (.365)
Previous Industry Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects No No No No
R-Squared .192 .512 .539 .580
Number of Observations 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194
Table 4: Testing for Spatial Mismatch
Log Offered Hourly Wage
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating the empirical 
model by weighted least squares. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are 
clustered by individual and reported in parentheses. In addition to the variables 
shown in the table, indicator variables for missing values on each covariate are also 
included in the regressions. See the Data Appendix for the precise definition and 
source of each variable.
Outcome Black Other Races Black Other Races
Looking for Job Last Week .027 -.013 .027 -.022
(.024) (.025) (.024) (.024)
Total Hours Spent Searching .679 -1.494 1.533 -.981
(1.104) (.924) (1.109) (.850)
Hours Spent:
Contacting Employers Directly .989 .266 .927 .160
(.325) (.274) (.330) (.227)
Contacting Public Employement Agency .968 .224 .929 .159
(.313) (.254) (.320) (.217)
Contacting Private Employment Agency .193 .317 .289 .340
(.075) (.172) (.090) (.152)
Contacting Friends or Relatives .189 .337 .287 .349
(.078) (.182) (.093) (.161)
Contacting School or University Empolyement Center .059 -.004 .053 -.010
(.049) (.035) (.049) (.034)
Contacting Union or Professional Registers -.066 -.116 .011 -.085
(.047) (.032) (.054) (.031)
Attending Job Training Programs or Courses -.152 -.123 -.114 -.088
(.182) (.200) (.206) (.207)
Placing or Answering Ads -.379 -.746 -.337 -.715
(.229) (.228) (.237) (.231)
Going to Interview .081 .033 .132 .066
(.079) (.066) (.074) (.061)
Sending our Resumes or Filling out Applications .638 -.404 .827 -.307
(.439) (.296) (.435) (.290)
Looking for Ads -.459 -1.096 -.399 -1.048
(.329) (.282) (.328) (.277)
Other Job Search Activities -.122 -.139 -.114 -.120
(.103) (.101) (.110) (.100)
Number of Applications 1.259 -.470 1.253 -.376
(.611) (.447) (.608) (.430)
Received Any Job Offer .018 .021 .021 .024
(.013) (.013) (.012) (.013)
Table 5: Racial Differences in Search Intensity
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors on racial identifiers from estimating  the empirical model by weighted 
least squares. The respective dependent variables are listedon the left of each column. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors are clustered by individual and reported in parentheses. In addition to the variables shown in the table, indicator 
variables for missing values on each covariate are also included in the regressions. See the Data Appendix for the precise 
definition and source of each variable.
Baseline Controls Full Set of Controls
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Black .002 .014 -.038 -.006 -.074 -.011 .028 -.000 .001 -.006 .087 .050
(.017) (.016) (.075) (.064) (.037) (.033) (.019) (.022) (.020) (.019) (.062) (.062)
Other Races -.032 -.032 -.196 -.177 -.071 -.058 .088 .066 -.003 .004 -.051 -.026
(.017) (.018) (.065) (.062) (.047) (.034) (.041) (.030) (.021) (.018) (.075) (.063)
Female .000 .002 -.052 -.051 .207 .188 -.158 -.127 .013 -.000 -.053 -.025
(.013) (.013) (.057) (.049) (.031) (.025) (.022) (.017) (.014) (.015) (.058) (.054)
Age -.002 -.003 .000 -.001 .005 -.001 .003 .001 -.006 -.000 -.009 -.012
(.004) (.003) (.013) (.010) (.008) (.007) (.006) (.005) (.004) (.004) (.010) (.010)
Age Squared  (÷100) -.001 .002 -.003 -.001 -.005 -.000 -.002 -.000 -.005 .000 .011 .012
(.004) (.003) (.013) (.010) (.009) (.007) (.007) (.006) (.004) (.004) (.011) (.011)
High School Graduate -.004 -.164 .223 -.215 -.004 .032
(.025) (.143) (.094) (.090) (.052) (.145)
Some College .010 -.006 .422 -.312 -.053 .011
(.025) (.153) (.092) (.090) (.048) (.149)
College Graduate .028 -.028 .436 -.326 -.030 .078
(.024) (.144) (.092) (.091) (.049) (.150)
Log Previous Weekly Earnings .015 .016 .095 -.014 -.054 .002
(.009) (.039) (.022) (.014) (.017) (.048)
Weeks Unemployed .000 .004 .708 -.001 -.000 .004
(.001) (.002) (.154) (.001) (.001) (.002)
Weeks Unemployed Squared  (÷100) -.000 -.002 -.001 -.001 -.000 -.003
(.000) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.001)
Quit Last Job -.024 .005 -.080 .110 .010 .043
(.019) (.115) (.057) (.068) (.034) (.076)
Last Job was Temporary -.031 -.081 -.033 -.019 -.007 .217
(.011) (.060) (.037) (.022) (.024) (.054)
Constant .138 .054 .418 .286 .615 -.246 .032 .461 .188 .460 .987 .868
(.094) (.110) (.354) (.318) (.186) (.180) (.110) (.131) (.083) (.110) (.225) (.329)
Previous Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-Squared .004 .020 .038 .096 .075 .302 .107 .258 .482 .141 .017 .149
Number of Observations 26,901 26,901 3,218 3,218 22,569 22,569 22,569 22,569 22,569 22,569 1,023 1,023
Blue Collar Jobs
Applied to Applied to
Table 6: Racial Differences in Search Strategies
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating the empirical model by weighted least squares. The respective dependent variables are listed at the top of each column. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by individual and reported in parentheses. In addition to the variables shown in the table, indicator variables for missing values on 
each covariate are also included in the regressions. See the Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Accept Offer
Didn't Apply
to Job Ad Since Too Far Away
Didn't Apply
White Collar Jobs
Applied to
Service Jobs
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Black -.112 -.050 .220 .156
(.054) (.053) (.029) (.029)
Other Races -.041 -.051 .076 .059
(.066) (.057) (.033) (.031)
Female -.057 -.038 -.044 -.067
(.047) (.048) (.024) (.024)
Age .009 .002 -.020 -.010
(.009) (.009) (.005) (.005)
Age Squared  (÷100) -.008 .000 .016 .006
(.011) (.010) (.006) (.006)
High School Graduate -.039 .015
(.113) (.053)
Some College -.001 -.054
(.117) (.053)
College Graduate .080 -.187
(.118) (.055)
.066 -.091
(.044) (.021)
Weeks Unemployed -.006 .000
(.002) (.001)
Weeks Unemployed Squared  (÷100) .004 .000
(.001) (.001)
Quit Last Job -.060 -.010
(.090) (.054)
Last Job was Temporary -.131 .039
(.074) (.032)
Constant .100 -.075 1.033 1.470
(.189) (.314) (.106) (.152)
Previous Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
R-Squared .027 .097 .079 .136
Number of Observations 1,225 1,225 5,230 5,230
Table 7: Racial Differences in Bargaining and Discount Rates
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating  the empirical model by 
weighted least squares. The respective dependent variables are listed at the top of each 
column. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by individual and reported 
in parentheses. In addition to the variables shown in the table, indicator variables for 
missing values on each covariate are also included in the regressions. See the Data 
Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Bargained over Offer
Chose $20 Now
Over $40 in 12 Weeks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Black -.160 -.127 -.162 -.152 -.160 -.152 -.160
(.060) (.058) (.054) (.059) (.060) (.065) (.060)
Other Races -.201 -.184 -.191 -.194 -.199 -.224 -.199
(.063) (.063) (.050) (.063) (.063) (.069) (.063)
Controls
Demographics, Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration of Unemployment, Quit Last Job Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Previous Industry, Previous Wage Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Search Intensity No Yes No No No No Yes
Search Strategy No No Yes No No No Yes
Bargaining No No No Yes No No Yes
Discounting No No No No Yes No Yes
Distance Traveled, Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes Yes
Table 8: Residual Racial Differences in Wage Offers
Log Offered Hourly Wage
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating the empirical model by weighted least squares. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by individual and reported in parentheses. See the Data Appendix for 
the precise definition and source of all variables.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black -.232 -.160 -.067 -.064 -.072
(.033) (.033) (.028) (.029) (.028)
Other Races -.112 -.087 -.053 -.051 -.061
(.046) (.040) (.036) (.035) (.031)
Female -.144 -.154 -.068 -.066 -.075
(.029) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.027)
Age .049 .044 .017 .017 .016
(.006) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Age Squared  (÷100) -.047 -.041 -.015 -.016 -.015
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
High School Graduate .065 .010 .005 .021
(.047) (.041) (.040) (.041)
Some College .286 .150 .145 .157
(.045) (.040) (.040) (.038)
College Graduate .554 .290 .283 .290
(.045) (.040) (.041) (.038)
Log Previous Weekly Earnings .424 .423 .415
(.027) (.028) (.029)
Weeks Unemployed -.002 -.002
(.001) (.001)
Weeks Unemployed Squared (÷100) -.001 .001
(.000) (.000)
Quit Last Job -.040 -.039
(.052) (.045)
Last Job was Temporary .014 .011
(.037) (.034)
Constant 1.873 1.656 -.405 -.356 -.293
(.126) (.120) (.174) (.181) (.189)
Previous Industry Fixed Effects No No No No Yes
R-Squared .162 .323 .549 .551 .559
Number of Observations 25,436 25,436 25,436 25,436 25,436
Table 9: Racial Differences in Reservation Wages
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating  the empirical model by 
weighted least squares. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by individual 
and reported in parentheses. In addition to the variables shown in the table, indicator variables 
for missing values on each covariate are also included in the regressions. See the Data 
Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Log Reservation Wage
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Black -.320 -.219 -.252
(.032) (.029) (.032)
Other Races -.140 -.116 -.123
(.036) (.032) (.039)
Female -.229 -.213 -.210
(.025) (.023) (.022)
Age .072 .059 .054
(.005) (.005) (.005)
Age Squared  (÷100) -.068 -.055 -.054
(.006) (.006) (.006)
High School Graduate .135 .130
(.049) (.047)
Some College .314 .316
(.048) (.047)
College Graduate .643 .655
(.048) (.047)
Weeks Unemployed -.001 -.000
(.001) (.001)
Weeks Unemployed Squared  (÷100) -.000 -.001
(.001) (.001)
Quit Last Job -.024 .006
(.050) (.049)
Last Job was Temporary -.153 -.110
(.034) (.033)
Tenure on Previous Job .019
(.002)
Tenure on Previous Job ! Black .011
(.004)
Tenure on Previous Job ! Other Races .000
(.005)
Constant 5.042 5.060 5.096
(.111) (.119) (.115)
Previous Industry Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
R-Squared .207 .407 .415
Number of Observations 5,207 5,207 5,207
Table 10: Racial Differences in Wages and the Return to Tenure, NJ UI Data
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating the 
empirical model by weighted least squares. Heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors are  reported in parentheses. In addition to the variables 
shown in the table, indicator variables for missing values on each covariate 
are also included in the regressions. See the Data Appendix for the precise 
definition and source of each variable.
Log Weekly Earnings
on Previous Job
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Black -.159 -.158 -.006 -.055 -.087 -.089 -.034 -.032 -.069
(.026) (.026) (.057) (.067) (.065) (.065) (.064) (.064) (.018)
Years of Schooling .055 .077 .060 .073 .080 .080 .069 .070 .071
(.011) (.014) (.011) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.012) (.012) (.012)
AFQT .083 .001 .083 .031 .014 .013 .077 .079 .068
(.014) (.033) (.014) (.039) (.038) (.039) (.036) (.036) (.031)
Years of Schooling ! Potential Experience -.003 -.002 -.001 -.002 -.004 -.004 -.002 -.002 -.002
(.003) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
AFQT ! Potential Experience .008 .005 .005 .005 .001 .002 .003
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Black ! Potential Experience -.014 -.010 -.009 -.009 -.010 -.009 -.006
(.005) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.002)
Tenure .030 .030 .019 .019 .019
(.002) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Tenure ! Black .011 .012 .008 .007 .007
(.004) (.005) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Tenure ! AFQT .000 -.001 -.001
(.002) (.001) (.001)
Additional Controls
Cubic Polynomial in Potential Experience Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Urban Residence Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Two-Digit Occupation at First Job Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years of Schooling ! Cubic Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AFQT ! Cubic Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Black ! Cubic Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Time Period 1979-92 1979-92 1979-92 1979-92 1979-92 1979-92 1979-06 1979-06 1979-06
R-Squared .292 .296 .296 .297 .326 .326 .406 .406 .406
Number of Observations 21,026 21,026 21,026 21,026 21,026 21,026 33,931 33,931 33,931
Table 11: Racial Differences in the Return to Tenure and Labor Market Experience, NLSY79
Log Hourly Wage
Notes: Entries in columns (1)-(4) are coefficients and standard errors from replicating the upper panel of Table 1 in Altonji and Pierret 
(2001). Columns (5)-(10) extend their analysis by controlling for tenure and adding additional years of data. As in Altonji and Pierret (2001) 
the sample consists of black and white non-Hispanic males, and the base year of the time trends is the last year of period under 
consideration. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by individual and reported in parentheses. See the Data Appendix as 
well as Altonji and Pierret (2001) for a description of the sample construction procedures.
OLS OLS OLS OLS Matching Estimator OLS OLS
Difference
Square in Log Only Only Oaxaca between Offered
Baseline Previous Earnings Best Offer Accepted Offers (Using Best Offers) Decomposition and Previous Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Black -.160 -.154 -.140 -.107 -.227 -.140 -.111
(.060) (.057) (.062) (.068) (.031) (.100) (.092)
Other Races -.201 -.190 -.173 -.123 -.151 -.190 -.194
(.063) (.061) (.059) (.071) (.041) (.083) (.096)
Controls
Demographics, Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration of Unemployment, Quit Last Job Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Previous Industry, Previous Wage Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table C.1: Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors on racial indicators from estimating the empirical model by weighted least squares. Standard errors are clustered by individual (if 
applicable) and  reported in parentheses. In addition to the controls shown in the table, indicator variables for missing values on each covariate are also included in the regressions. See the 
Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable. Column (1) shows our main result from Table 2, and column (2) adds the square of Log Previous Weekly Earnings to 
the set of controls. Estimates of our baseline specification using only individuals' best offers during the 12 week survey period are displayed in column (3). Similarly, column (4) uses only 
accepted offers. Results using the nearest neighbor matching estimator in Imbens and Abadie (2002) are shown in column (5). Column (6) performs an Oaxaca decomposition of racial 
difference in offered wages. The displayed estimates correpond to the racial gap due to differences in coefficients (using the paramaters estimated for whites as reference). To account for 
measurement error or mean reversion in previous wages column (7) estimates racial gaps in the difference between an offered hourly wage and an individual's hourly wage on the previous 
job. Note that this is equivalen to estimating our main specification restricting to coefficient on previous wage to unity.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black -.435 -.305 -.164 -.169 -.132
(.090) (.108) (.086) (.094) (.115)
Other Races -.245 -.229 -.137 -.143 -.192
(.119) (.104) (.090) (.098) (.094)
Age .041 .046 -.016 -.017 -.025
(.032) (.030) (.027) (.025) (.025)
Age Squared (÷100) -.039 -.047 .021 .021 .029
(.039) (.036) (.032) (.031) (.029)
High School Graduate .109 .042 .027 -.020
(.214) (.155) (.143) (.148)
Some College .503 .233 .218 .159
(.214) (.160) (.146) (.141)
College Graduate .590 .246 .231 .230
(.241) (.167) (.152) (.153)
Log Previous Weekly Earnings .480 .467 .471
(.077) (.074) (.079)
Weeks Unemployed -.007 -.008
(.004) (.004)
Weeks Unemployed Squared (÷100) .004 .005
(.002) (.002)
Quit Last Job -.342 -.345
(.137) (.141)
Last Job was Temporary .055 .061
(.117) (.129)
Constant 2.030 1.584 -.181 .106 .351
(.628) (.607) (.572) (.599) (.635)
Previous Industry Fixed Effects No No No No Yes
R-Squared .123 .252 .457 .481 .506
Number of Observations 599 599 599 599 599
Table C.2: Racial Differences in Wage Offers, NJ UI Data — Males
Log Offered Hourly Wage
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating  the empirical model by 
weighted least squares. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by individual 
and reported in parentheses. In addition to the variables shown in the table, indicator variables 
for missing values on each covariate are also included in the regressions. See the Data 
Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black -.404 -.297 -.212 -.205 -.219
(.070) (.062) (.062) (.062) (.062)
Other Races -.259 -.231 -.203 -.207 -.189
(.108) (.090) (.082) (.080) (.073)
Age .042 .035 .015 .019 .019
(.011) (.013) (.014) (.014) (.012)
Age Squared (÷100) -.044 -.033 -.013 -.016 -.018
(.014) (.016) (.017) (.016) (.015)
High School Graduate -.178 -.228 -.224 -.183
(.087) (.102) (.112) (.107)
Some College .068 -.041 -.021 .046
(.092) (.087) (.103) (.105)
College Graduate .385 .164 .172 .223
(.092) (.086) (.094) (.101)
Log Previous Weekly Earnings .326 .329 .360
(.056) (.051) (.055)
Weeks Unemployed -.002 -.003
(.002) (.002)
Weeks Unemployed Squared (÷100) .001 .002
(.001) (.001)
Quit Last Job .111 .115
(.133) (.123)
Last Job was Temporary .040 .055
(.069) (.066)
Constant 1.927 1.852 .302 .237 -.012
(.228) (.287) (.378) (.390) (.375)
Previous Industry Fixed Effects No No No No Yes
R-Squared .210 .379 .485 .496 .528
Number of Observations 595 595 595 595 595
Table C.3: Racial Differences in Wage Offers, NJ UI Data — Females
Log Offered Hourly Wage
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating  the empirical model by 
weighted least squares. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by individual 
and reported in parentheses. In addition to the variables shown in the table, indicator variables 
for missing values on each covariate are also included in the regressions. See the Data 
Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Black -.132 -.107 -.167 -.138 -.139 -.112 -.185
(.115) (.105) (.119) (.117) (.117) (.103) (.097)
Other Races -.192 -.186 -.150 -.184 -.188 -.254 -.164
(.094) (.087) (.079) (.095) (.094) (.109) (.070)
Controls
Demographics, Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration of Unemployment, Quit Last Job Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Previous Industry, Previous Wage Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Search Intensity No Yes No No No No Yes
Search Strategy No No Yes No No No Yes
Bargaining No No No Yes No No Yes
Discounting No No No No Yes No Yes
County Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes Yes
Table C.4: Residual Racial Differences in Wage Offers — Males
Log Offered Hourly Wage
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating the empirical model by weighted least squares. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by individual and reported in parentheses. See the Data 
Appendix for the precise definition and source of all variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Black -.219 -.189 -.219 -.203 -.218 -.155 -.130
(.062) (.063) (.053) (.059) (.063) (.061) (.052)
Other Races -.189 -.161 -.197 -.192 -.189 -.176 -.162
(.073) (.072) (.049) (.071) (.074) (.065) (.055)
Controls
Demographics, Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration of Unemployment, Quit Last Job Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Previous Industry, Previous Wage Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Search Intensity No Yes No No No No Yes
Search Strategy No No Yes No No No Yes
Bargaining No No No Yes No No Yes
Discounting No No No No Yes No Yes
County Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes Yes
Table C.5: Residual Racial Differences in Wage Offers — Females
Log Offered Hourly Wage
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating the empirical model by weighted least squares. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by individual and reported in parentheses. See the Data 
Appendix for the precise definition and source of all variables.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Black -.382 -.258 -.305
(.050) (.047) (.054)
Other Races -.194 -.152 -.191
(.054) (.047) (.056)
Age .094 .079 .075
(.008) (.007) (.007)
Age Squared  (÷100) -.091 -.080 -.077
(.009) (.008) (.008)
High School Graduate .076 .070
(.075) (.074)
Some College .288 .286
(.077) (.075)
College Graduate .643 .649
(.075) (.074)
Weeks Unemployed -.001 -.000
(.002) (.002)
Weeks Unemployed Squared  (÷100) -.000 -.001
(.001) (.001)
Quit Last Job .085 .111
(.082) (.078)
Last Job was Temporary -.086 -.047
(.049) (.049)
Tenure on Previous Job .019
(.003)
Tenure on Previous Job ! Black .010
(.006)
Tenure on Previous Job ! Other Races .008
(.006)
Constant 4.581 4.703 4.726
(.164) (.177) (.168)
Previous Industry Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
R-Squared .218 .386 .433
Number of Observations 2,487 2,487 2,487
Table C.6: Racial Differences in Wages and the Return to Tenure, NJ UI Data — Males
Log Weekly Earnings
on Previous Job
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating the empirical model by 
weighted least squares. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are  reported in 
parentheses. In addition to the variables shown in the table, indicator variables for missing 
values on each covariate are also included in the regressions. See the Data Appendix for 
the precise definition and source of each variable.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Black -.261 -.167 -.194
(.040) (.034) (.037)
Other Races -.080 -.074 -.045
(.041) (.039) (.047)
Age .050 .039 .036
(.007) (.006) (.006)
Age Squared  (÷100) -.045 -.034 -.034
(.008) (.008) (.007)
High School Graduate .190 .172
(.055) (.052)
Some College .326 .320
(.051) (.049)
College Graduate .633 .635
(.052) (.050)
Weeks Unemployed .000 .001
(.001) (.001)
Weeks Unemployed Squared  (÷100) -.000 -.001
(.001) (.001)
Quit Last Job -.113 -.085
(.053) (.054)
Last Job was Temporary -.232 -.185
(.042) (.043)
Tenure on Previous Job .018
(.003)
Tenure on Previous Job ! Black .012
(.005)
Tenure on Previous Job ! Other Races -.009
(.008)
Constant 5.260 5.167 5.195
(.133) (.143) (.135)
Previous Industry Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
R-Squared .133 .336 .366
Number of Observations 2,720 2,720 2,720
Table C.7: Racial Differences in Wages and the Return to Tenure, NJ UI Data — Females
Log Weekly Earnings
on Previous Job
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating the empirical model by 
weighted least squares. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are  reported in 
parentheses. In addition to the variables shown in the table, indicator variables for missing 
values on each covariate are also included in the regressions. See the Data Appendix for 
the precise definition and source of each variable.
